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ABSTRACT 
Historically, companies disseminated financial information via the press release. 
The ability to disseminate information now exists on multiple “new media” channels 
beyond just the press release, with each channel reaching a different audience. With 
the different channels of communication come different connotations and associations 
that people have about the channels, which may affect the interpretation of the 
message, thereby altering management’s ability to effectively communicate with 
stakeholders. I investigate whether retail investors’ processing of financial information 
disclosures is dependent upon the fit between the channel and the type of information 
sent on the channel. Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model, I experimentally test how 
good and bad financial information posted on a social media channel, Twitter, compares 
to a more traditional channel, a company investor relations page where financial 
information is traditionally posted. I find that Twitter is associated with investors 
processing financial information unconsciously on the peripheral route while conscious 
or central route processing is associated with information coming from the company’s 
investor relations page. Additionally, I find that investors have lower perceptions of 
management credibility after viewing financial disclosures on a company’s Twitter feed 
than after viewing the same disclosures on the company’s investor relations page. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Questions and Motivation 
Disseminating financial information is a traditional function of the investor 
relations departments of public companies. Investor relations activities involve posting 
announcements of quarterly and annual financial results, management forecasts, and 
more recently, live tweeting of CEO and CFO comments from conference calls. Firms 
are now allowed, under recent SEC rulings, to disseminate financial disclosures that fall 
under Regulation Financial Disclosure (Reg FD) across multiples channels, such as 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and SlideShare, as long as the channel is disclosed to 
investors before the announcement. In a study of 807 companies, Jung et al. (2014) 
finds that over 50 percent of the S&P 1500 firms use Twitter or Facebook and 35.2 
percent used social media at least once to release earnings announcements. Although 
companies use social media for investor relations, they are unsure of how best to 
leverage the technology (Barnes and Lescault 2012, Evans 2011). Therefore, it is 
important to understand whether a firm’s use of social media for investor relations has a 
positive or negative influence on investors. In this study, I investigate whether the use of 
Twitter by companies for releasing financial information affects retail investors’ 
perceptions of management credibility and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, I 
investigate whether the effects of releasing financial information on Twitter varies by 
news valence (i.e., good news versus bad news). 
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The trend to use social media for business is not limited to companies.  A recent 
survey of buy-side investors and sell-side analysts found that 12 percent had made an 
investment decision after initially sourcing information from Twitter, and 28 percent had 
investigated a business issue based on something seen on Twitter (Brunswick Group 
2012). Of those polled, 56 percent responded that the role of blogs, micro-blogging 
services (i.e. Twitter) and social networking sites in the investment decision process 
was increasing (Brunswick Group 2012). Brunswick also found that information sourced 
directly from companies has the most influence on the investment decisions of 
professional investors. Reg FD was enacted in 1999 by the SEC to ensure that all 
investors received material information at the same time. The implicit (untested) 
assumption of the regulation is that financial disclosures are interpreted in the same 
manner by investors, regardless of channel.  
The efficient market hypothesis argues that prices reflect new information, 
regardless of where and how the information is disclosed. However, the ability to 
disseminate information now exists on multiple channels beyond just the press release, 
with each channel reaching a different audience. With the different channels of 
communication come different inherent strengths, along with connotations and 
associations that people have about the channels. Product channel fit theory posits that 
when the strengths of the channel and the characteristics of the product align or fit 
together, consumers are best able to achieve their consumption goals (Bang et al. 
2013). The strengths of the channel combined with the associations and connotations 
that investors have about a channel may not always fit with the characteristics of the 
message being disseminated on the channel. The lack of fit between channel and 
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message could interfere with investors’ processing of the information sent. Social 
media, as a channel, has experienced rapid growth, and generally refers to activities 
integrating electronic technologies with social interactions. It is unclear whether the use 
of social media to disseminate financial information would be viewed positively, 
negatively, or not any differently from traditional sources. Investors could view a 
company as forward thinking, innovative and transparent upon adoption of social media 
for financial information dissemination. Alternatively, the same action could be viewed 
as an ill-advised attempt at using a medium intended for social interactions for the 
serious business of conveying information about financial performance. Incorrect use of 
the medium could be attributed to the company’s ignorance of the medium, the 
medium’s intended audience, and potentially, what the company itself is and who its 
true customers and investors are. Finally, investors may view social media adoption for 
financial information as merely one more outlet in the cornucopia of outlets that has 
emerged with the advent of the internet, due to familiarity with the media, the company, 
or overall desensitization to news events. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a company is a “nexus of contracts,” in 
which a contract is defined as a legal agreement between two parties. A contract can 
specify in what circumstances an individual is to be social on behalf of the company, but 
the contract itself inherently lacks the qualities necessary to be social. Yet companies 
attempt to be seen as social actors by being on platforms dedicated to increasing social 
interaction. The message discrepancy, caused by lack of fit, of a non-social actor on a 
social platform could cause unintended cognitive dissonance for the message receiver, 
causing the message to be processed unconsciously (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The 
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same information could be processed consciously if message discrepancy is absent 
and the scenario is viewed positively or even indifferently. The scenario could then be 
viewed as an argument rather than a cue, and per the Elaboration Likelihood Model the 
information would be processed consciously along with all the other information 
participants use to make their decision (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Thus, the research 
question is whether investors interpret financial information from different disclosure 
platforms the same or whether their interpretations vary across platforms. 
I address the research question by conducting an experiment in which I 
manipulate disclosure platform, between a company’s Twitter feed or investor relations 
page, and whether the company beats (good news) or misses (bad news) analyst 
forecasts. I extend product-channel fit theory from the product domain to the information 
domain and test the idea that the channel a corporation uses to disseminate financial 
information influences investors’ perceptions of management credibility, and ultimately 
their judgment and decision about investing in the firm. Using the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I am able to explain how good and bad financial 
information through a company’s Twitter feed compares to the same information posted 
on the company’s investor relations page, where financial information is traditionally 
posted.  
Research is mixed on the influence of news valence. Mercer (2005) predicts and 
finds that increased transparency, especially around negative news, increases 
management credibility, at least in the short term. Yet Jung et al. (2014) find that firms 
rarely release negative news on social media, even when they commit to releasing 
financial information on the channel. Lee et al. (2015) finds that firms have to 
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substantially increase the number of posts on social media after experiencing a product 
recall to have the same influence as a post on the company website or RSS feed. Liu et 
al. (2014) find that firms with negative news are more likely to release positive news 
releases to counter the negative news, indicating that firms bundle good and bad news 
together (Dye 2013).  
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) explains why a perceptual difference 
could occur across these disclosure channels via the constructs of routes: peripheral 
and central. The central route is the cognitive route taken when a decision is made 
consciously, such as assessing the merits of a specific action. For example, the 
decision of whether or not to invest in a stock, bond or mutual fund would be processed 
on the central route. The peripheral route is the cognitive route taken when a decision is 
made unconsciously, such as when one is prompted by a positive or negative cue or 
cues. Two people can arrive at the same conclusion to a problem though one uses the 
central route and the other the peripheral route. However, those decisions, perceptions 
or attitudes that occur because of central route processing are, in general, more stable, 
enduring and more predictive of long term behavior compared to those behaviors 
arising from peripheral route processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  
For my experiment, evidence of central route processing was measured using 
perceptions of argument quality and disclosure credibility, while evidence of peripheral 
route processing was measured using perceptions of perceived usefulness and attitude, 
all latent constructs, following Bhattacharjee and Sanford (2006). Participants in the 
experiment were shown only one disclosure bundle, starting either at the company’s 
Twitter feed (low fit) or investor relations page (high fit), on which headlines for press 
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releases were seen.  In the good and bad news conditions, the press releases were 
viewed, followed by a Reuters article on the annual report and information about 
whether the company missed or beat forecasts. Participants then answered questions 
that measure the latent variables.  I argue that, compared to the company’s investor 
relations page, financial disclosures made via Twitter are less persuasive as measured 
by the latent constructs of argument quality and disclosure credibility for central route 
processing and perceived usefulness and attitude for peripheral route processing. 
Furthermore, I posit that there is an interaction of bad news or missing forecasts with 
Twitter that further decreases investors’ perception of management credibility rather 
than raising it as predicted by Mercer (2005). Additionally, such an interaction would 
explain why Lee et al. (2015) find that firms must issue more social media posts than 
company blog posts during product recalls. 
To test the research hypotheses, I use 807 participants recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. As proxies for retail investors, participants take on the role of a 
member in a hypothetical investment club that had purchased 1000 shares of Lafarge 
S.A., a company headquartered and traded on the Paris Stock exchange and active on 
social media. Participants were randomly assigned to see Lafarge press releases 
announced either on the company’s Twitter feed or investor relations web page followed 
by a Reuters article that Lafarge had missed or beat analyst forecasts for the 2012 fiscal 
year followed by the press release of the 2012 annual report. Participants then judged 
the attractiveness of Lafarge as an investment, recommended the number of shares to 
buy or sell to the club, how long to hold the shares and provided perceptions of 
management credibility followed by questions related to ELM. Structural equation 
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modeling was used to determine the extent to which participants used either the central 
route or the peripheral route in making their management credibility assessment. 
ANOVA was used to determine if management credibility varied by platform and news 
valence. 
I find that investors process financial information posted on Twitter via the 
peripheral or unconscious route more so than the central or conscious route. 
Furthermore, I find that financial disclosures on social media are associated with lower 
overall investor belief of management credibility, which I show to significantly influence 
investor judgment and decisions about the company. Additionally, I find that retail 
investors seeing financial disclosures on social media have significantly lower 
perceptions of the disclosures’ argument quality, credibility and usefulness, along with 
overall lower perceptions of the usefulness of the channel. These findings are robust to 
whether the investors received good or bad news about the company. Investors seeing 
good news had higher perceptions of argument quality, credibility and usefulness and a 
more positive attitude towards the channel than those that saw bad news. 
This is the first study to investigate how information is perceived and processed 
across different communication channels. The findings of this study suggest that when 
making financial disclosures, management needs to ensure that there is a strong fit 
between message characteristics and the strengths of the channel used to disseminate 
the information, as doing so will enhance management credibility. Additionally, 
management should not rely upon social media as the sole avenue for financial 
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information dissemination until there is a higher fit1 between the channel and its use for 
disclosing financial information. Instead, companies should use as many channels as 
possible, preferably more established channels, such as news wires and corporate 
websites to issue announcements in compliance with Reg FD. Additionally, the findings 
validate the SEC’s trend of allowing Reg FD compliance via new channels, such as the 
April 2013 ruling on allowing Reg FD disclosures on new communication channels and 
the 2009 ruling to allow Reg FD disclosures on corporations’ blogs. My findings suggest 
that continuance of the policy of encouraging transparency regardless of channel should 
be supported. The findings suggest that rather than being a catalyst for investor hype, 
new communication channels are viewed skeptically by retail investors.  Additionally, 
the findings inform academics seeking to understand the effects of new communication 
channels on retail2 investors.  The study contributes to the academic literature by 
extending product-channel fit beyond physical products to include information.  Another 
contribution is the use of the well-established Elaboration Likelihood Model in the 
context of financial disclosures on social media to show how the fit between channel 
and message influences investor processing of the message and the subsequent effect 
on management credibility. 
In the next section, I frame the background to this study and discuss related 
literature.  Next, I discuss the Elaboration Likelihood Model and hypotheses.  
Thereafter, I explain the experimental design and method.  Finally, I discuss the results 
of the experiment and conclusions.  
                                            
1 It is outside the scope of this dissertation to investigate the conditions necessary for there to be a higher 
fit between social media and their use for releasing financial. However, my results show that five years 
after the majority of firms adopted Twitter (in 2009) there is low fit between the channel and financial 
disclosures. 
2 The synonymous term “nonprofessional investor” is often used in the literature. 
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2.0 BACKGROUND & PRIOR LITERATURE 
This chapter begins by covering a brief history of social media. Corporations use 
of social media for both Regulation Financial Disclosure and other purposes are then 
covered. Retail investor use of financial information released by companies is covered 
next, followed by retail and professional investor use of social media. Finally, disclosure 
strategies of companies for good and bad news is discussed along with the empirical 
evidence surrounding said strategies. 
2.1 Brief History of Social Media 
Before discussing the history of a phenomenon, one should first define the 
phenomenon. The same logic holds when discussing the history of social media. Safko 
(2012) argues in The Social Media Bible that “social media is the media we use to be 
social (p. 3).” The first part of the term, social, refers to the interaction of organisms, 
homo sapiens and others, with other organisms. The second part of the term, media, 
refers to the technologies we use to make those connections. Being social through 
media is then not as novel a phenomenon as the popular press makes the term out to 
be, as various media through time have been used to communicate between individuals 
and groups. In various regions of the world one can find communication via drums, 
bells, the written word, the printed word, cans and string, telegraph, telephone, radio, 
television, paintings, photographs, websites, mobile technologies, and text messages, 
to name a few. 
Standage (2011) points out that even the idea of something going “viral,” or an 
idea taking on a life of its own beyond the original creator’s control, goes at least as far 
back as Martin Luther, when on October 31st 1517 he nailed his “95 Theses on the 
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Power of Efficacy of Indulgences” to a church door in Wittenberg in present day 
Germany. By December, pamphlets and broadsheets of the theses appeared in three 
cities in Germany, Leipzig, Nuremberg and Basel, financed by Luther’s friends that had 
received copies from him. The original pamphlets were in Latin, but German translations 
quickly followed and, Standage argues, spread through social networks. Standage 
quotes Luther’s friend Friedrich Myconius who wrote that “hardly 14 days had passed 
when these propositions were known throughout Germany and within four weeks almost 
all of Christendom was familiar with them,” to support the notion that Luther’s message 
had spread rapidly. Standage argues that the 95 Theses spread in a way that would be 
familiar even now, as the message spread through decentralized systems whose 
members decided which messages were important by sharing them. This could happen 
in Luther’s time because the cost of creating printed material had dramatically 
decreased since the introduction of Gutenburg’s press in 1450. Since the cost of 
obtaining a pamphlet was low (about the price of a chicken,) printers were able to obtain 
monetary gain by reprinting and selling more pamphlets, usually in batches of 1,000. 
Reprints served as an indicator of an item’s popularity similar to “Likes” and retweets 
today. By the reprints indication, Luther was extremely popular. In the first decade of the 
Reformation, over 6 million pamphlets were published; over a quarter of those were 
written by Luther. Others joined in the debate started by Luther, either for or against, by 
also having pamphlets published, notably Sylvester Mazzolini with his “Dialogue Against 
the Presumptuous Theses of Martin Luther.” What would now be familiar to viewers in 
almost any comments sections of popular websites, Luther and Mazzolini exchanged 
blows like argumentative bloggers. The sparring of two writers via the printed words 
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would play out centuries later on the American continent in what is now compiled as the 
Federalist papers. 
Standage points out that the written word was not the only tactic used. The news 
ballad was also used to inform the illiterate and to have them spread it. Woodcuts, a 
combination of bold graphics and text were used to inform the masses and served as 
visual aids for preachers. The tactics worked and Luther’s enemies likened the spread 
of his ideas to the spread of a disease that even the excommunication of Luther could 
not stop. Luther’s message had gone viral, to use the modern idiom for the 
phenomenon. 
The Internet was originally established to provide a decentralized communication 
network infrastructure.  Several university professors and research departments were 
investigating how to send messages electronically in the early 1970s. One the earliest 
uses of the Internet was in 1979, when Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis at Duke University 
created Usenet. Usenet was a worldwide discussion system that allowed those that 
knew about it and had access to it to post messages that could be seen by everyone 
that had access to Usenet. Out of Usenet and similar websites came Bulletin Board 
Systems (BBS), which allowed users to post code, download games and were generally 
hosted locally by technology hobbyists who encouraged the social aspect of the BBS, 
which resulted in members of the BBS meeting up in a decidedly social manner. 
Compuserve, created in the 1970s for businesses, expanded to consumers in the 1980s 
and allowed members to not only use email, but to also access thousands of discussion 
forums. American Online (AOL) sped up the acceptance of the computer connectivity 
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and its member-created communities, including innovations such as member profiles, 
which exist today in other social networks.  
One of the earliest social networking sites was Classmates.com, founded in 
1995.  It sought to link old classmates together. A few years later, in 1997, 
SixDegrees.com was established and was one of the very first to allow user profiles, 
invite friends, organize groups, and view other profiles. In 1998, Bruce and Susan 
Ableson created Open Diary, with the intent of bringing online diary writers into one 
community, or social network. Open Diary was the first site to allow comments on 
individual entries and to allow public and private diaries. At the same time the term 
“blog,” short for web log, came into being. Combining the idea of an online diary and 
social network, Friendster.com was established in 2002 and a similar site Myspace.com 
followed in 2003. The wildly successful Facebook.com was launched in 2004, with the 
business network oriented site LinkedIn.com established in 2003.  
While still in their infancy, Facebook, and Myspace, and similar sites were 
creating what is referred to as Web 2.0. Web 1.0 was the platform whereby an author, 
usually a single person, created static content. Web 2.0 refers to how both developers 
and end users utilize the World Wide Web as a platform where content and applications 
are continuously updated and modified by all users in a participatory and collaborative 
fashion (Kaplan and Haenlien 2010). Blogs and wikis are such examples. Web 2.0 sites 
are generally more interactive, having animation, interactivity, and audio/video streams 
enabled by Adobe Flash or other languages such as HTML5, Really Simple Syndication 
(RSS) that allows for frequently updated content to be pushed to subscribers, and 
Asynchronous Java Script and XML (AJAX) that allows the update of web content in 
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real time but doesn’t interfere with the display or behavior of the whole page. Web 2.0 is 
a technical framework that allows for the synthesis of all ways that people make use of 
social media, known as User Generated Content (UGC), as argued by Kaplan and 
Haenlien (2010). UGC emerged in 2005 and was defined by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2007 to have three main 
requirements: (1) content has to be published on a publicly accessible website or social 
network site, (2) content has to show a certain amount of creative effort, and (3) it needs 
to have been created outside of professional routines and practices. Such a definition 
excludes email or instant messaging (IM) or copying and pasting a newspaper article or 
retweet, and all content that has been created with a commercial market context in 
mind. Kaplan and Haenlien (2010) argue that “social media is a group of internet-based 
applications that build on the idealogical and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and 
that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content (p. 61)”. 
Social media platforms are not monolithic, as each platform offers similar, though 
distinct, functions and users may not subscribe to all platforms. The number of 
individuals who use social media continues to grow rapidly; Facebook reported over one 
billion active users in 2012 as compared to 845 million users in 2011 and 350 million 
users in 2010 (Tam 2013).  Despite common misperceptions that most social media 
users are relatively young, the average age of Facebook users is approximately 40 
years old, with all age groups reporting Facebook use greater than 35 percent (Pew 
2013; Pingdom 2012). Twitter users’ average age is approximately 3,7 but has a smaller 
reach with only 16 percent of all internet users using the service (Pingdom 2012; Pew 
2013). Twitter users are skewed away from those internet users age 65 or older (2 
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percent) compared to 27 percent use among 18 to 29 year olds and 16 percent use 
among 30 to 49 year olds (Pew 2013). Overall, over 60 percent of all American adults 
are now engaged on at least one social media platform (Pew 2013).  
Twitter was originally envisioned as a mobile status updating service between 
individuals that answered the question, “What are you doing?” (Twitter 2009). The 
prompt changed to “What’s happening?” after organizations and businesses started 
using the service to share anything and everything on the network (Twitter 2009). 
However, the service is still primarily individual focused, with the top ten followed Twitter 
users being prominent individuals in the media, entertainment, and political spheres, 
specifically Katy Perry, Justin Bieber, Barack Obama, YouTube, Taylor Swift, Lady 
Gaga, Britney Spears, Rihanna, Instagram, and Justin Timberlake, in that order. Katy 
Perry has over 54 million followers and Justin Timberlake has a little over 33 million 
(Twittercounter retrieved 7/25/14). Similarly, the most retweeted or shared Tweets are 
also entertainment based, with Ellen Degeneres’s “selfie” with attendees at the 2014 
Oscars currently holding the top spot with over 3.4 million retweets (Favstar 2014). 
Before Ellen’s Oscar “selfie,” Barack Obama’s tweet of “Four more years” after winning 
the 2012 Presidential election was with 78l thousand retweets. More broadly, a random 
sample of two thousand tweets in 2009 found that 40.55 percent and 37.55 percent of 
the tweets were classified as pointless babble and conversational, with only 8.7 percent 
considered to carry any pass-on value. News from mainstream news organizations was 
3.6 percent of total tweets, with spam and self-promotion rounding out the sample with 
3.75 and 5.85 percent of total tweets respectively (Kelly 2009). When Twitter users were 
asked how often they use the site to post their own content and what content they post, 
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the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2010) found that 72 percent posted 
updates related to their personal life, 62 percent shared content related to their work life, 
with 55 percent sharing links to news stories and 54 percent retweeting material posted 
by others. Sharing photos, videos and location information were the least likely to be 
shared. 
2.2 Corporations’ Use of Social Media 
2.2.1 Determinants 
Previous research has investigated determinants of corporations’ use of 
conference calls (Tasker 1998, Frankel et al. 1999, Bushee et al. 2003), corporate 
websites (Ettredge et al. 2002, Debreceny et al. 2003, Kelton and Yang 2008), press 
releases (Bamber and Cheon 1998), analyst meetings (Bamber and Cheon 1998), 
restated versus standalone 8-K filing (Myers et al. 2013) and conference presentations 
(Bushee et al. 2011). Only one study, Jung et al. (2014), has empirically investigated 
the determinants of financial reporting via social media, in particular via Facebook and 
Twitter. Investigating firms on the S&P 1500, the authors find a positive association 
between firm size and Twitter use, and a negative association between firm size and 
Facebook use for earnings news. The finding of larger firms using Twitter is contrary to 
the argument put forth by Blankespoor et al. (2014) that smaller firms benefit more than 
larger firms from Twitter use. Jung et al. (2014) do find that firms with low analyst 
followings are more likely to use social media platforms for earnings dissemination, 
similar to the argument by Blankespoor et al. (2014). The size of the firms’ social media 
presence, which Jung et al. (2014) proxy using the number of “followers” on Twitter or 
Llikes” on Facebook was found to be negatively associated with firm use of the 
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platform(s) for earnings news, indicating that large firms with large social media 
presence are using the platforms more for advertising or other marketing purposes and 
not to reach investors. Whereas prior literature on voluntary adoption of disclosure 
platforms had found market-to-book (MTB), firm performance (ROA) and growth to be 
positively associated with adoption of the disclosure channel, these findings do not hold 
in the adoption of social media platforms. Looking at firms that commit to earnings 
releases on social media, Jung et al. (2014) find that none of the traditional measures 
hold for committed disclosure on Facebook and only size is statistically significant for 
firms’ commitment to disclose on Twitter. Overall, Jung et al. (2014) find that a large 
social media presence, as measured by Twitter and Facebook followers, is positively 
associated with reporting earnings on Facebook and Twitter. This finding is interesting 
as it implies that knowledge of the media and the firm’s audience, as shown by the 
ability to build a social presence, is more important to the decision to release financial 
information on social media than financial resources or future prospects. 
2.2.2 Use of social media for non-Reg FD disclosures 
One of the earliest and most comprehensive surveys of 2,847 executives by 
McKinsey in 2007, asked how executives are using Web 2.0 technologies. 70 percent of 
the McKinsey respondents were using some combination of technologies to interface 
with customers. Fifty-one percent were using Web 2.0 to interface with suppliers and/or 
partners, with 75 percent using the technologies to manage collaboration internally with 
half using it for knowledge management and the remainder using it for product design 
and development. 
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In 2010, Culnan et al. found that 53 percent of the Fortune 500 companies had 
adopted Twitter, 46 percent had adopted Facebook, 20 percent were using blogs and 
11 percent were using client-hosted forums. Rybalko and Seltzer (2010) investigate 
dialogic communication among 93 randomly sampled Fortune 500 companies with 
active Twitter accounts (i.e. those that have posted within one month). They classified 
61 percent of firms as dialogic (or two-way communication) firms with the remainder, 39 
percent, as non-dialogic (or one-way communication) firms. Gathering ten tweets from 
each firm, they find that the most common two-way communications were the 
companies’ responses to specific users posts, 58.1 percent tweeted newsworthy 
information about the company, while 30.1 percent attempted to create a dialog by 
tweeting a question. In general, 74.5 percent of the tweets surveyed by Rybalko and 
Seltzer were directed at a general audience, followed by 23.7 percent of tweets directed 
at specific users and 0.9 percent to ‘other’ audiences, with only 0.4 percent directed at 
employees. Mirzoyan (2013) sampled 166 Fortune 500 firms, finding slightly different 
results than Rybalko and Seltzer (2010), with 49 percent of sampled firms using non-
dialogic communication and up to 70 percent of all posts representing one-way 
communication. Only 24 percent of firms had balanced strategies of one-way and two-
way communication. Only 27 percent of firms had mostly two-way communication.  
In a study of the 100 largest nonprofit organizations’ utilizations of Twitter, 
Lovejoy and Saxton (2012) find that the 58.6 percent of the tweets are one-way 
communication classified as information, 25.8 percent of tweets are around community 
with the largest percentage (13.2) dealing with giving recognition and thanks. They also 
found that 14.3 percent of tweets were two-way communication such as responses to 
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reply messages (8.2) or response solicitation (4.1). The remainder of tweets (15.6 
percent) dealt with calls for action, such as promoting an event (7.8) or a donation 
appeal (3.1), which were the two highest, respectively.  
Meske and Stieglitz (2013), investigating the adoption of social media inside  
German corporations via an online survey, find improved communication, faster access 
to in-house information and knowledge, and improved collaboration  access are the 
main drivers of adoption across small, medium and large enterprises. Positive influence 
on corporate culture, faster access to in-house experts, reduction of travel costs, and no 
goal or no added value are the lowest ranking objectives of adopting social media such 
as wikis, blogs and internal social networks. 
2.2.3 Use of social media for Reg FD disclosures 
In regards to firm use of social media for financial information, Barnes and 
Lescault (2012) find both Fortune 500 and Inc. 500 companies are keenly aware of 
social media, expending considerable financial resources to engage users across 
various social media platforms.  A study of 807 publicly traded companies found that 63 
percent use Twitter, 40 percent use Facebook, 29 percent use YouTube, and 18 
percent use their corporate blogs to disseminate investor-related material (Joyce 2012). 
Currently, 23 percent of Fortune 500 companies engage in blogging to communicate 
with social media users, while 44 percent of Inc. 500 companies do so (Barnes and 
Lescault 2012).  Additionally, in a 2012 survey of 170 Inc. 500 executives, 44 percent 
responded that their company intended to increase social media spending, while 41 
percent intended to maintain current spending levels.  Firms’ social media spending has 
consistently increased over the past eight years (Barnes and Lescault 2012).  
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Jung et al. (2014) investigated the use of Facebook and Twitter for earnings 
releases by the S&P 1500 firms and find that 35.2 percent of firms (232 total) had 
released earnings news at least once on Facebook, but only 18.53 percent of those 
firms who had released earnings on Facebook continued to do so (43 total firms or 2.87 
percent of S&P 1500 firms). The numbers are better for the 1500 largest corporations’ 
adoption of Twitter for earnings news, with 57.3 percent (406 total) using the platform. 
Additionally, 22.17 percent (90 total) out of the 406 firms continue to do so, representing 
six percent of the S&P 1500 firms.  
In the largest study to date, Zhou et al. (2015) studied 9,861 firms’ use of social 
media and find that 49 percent of firms have adopted either Facebook or Twitter, with 
30 percent adopting both, and the largest number of firms adopting in 2009. Collecting 
1,140,382 posts from Facebook and 3,433,846 tweets from Twitter, Zhou et al. use a 
support vector machines learning algorithm to classify the posts and N-fold cross 
validation test to evaluate the classification performance of the algorithm. They find that 
92.94 (7.06) and 96.55 (3.45) percent, respectively all of Facebook posts and tweets 
are non-disclosure (disclosure) messages. Of those message that are related to 
disclosures, only Twitter is the preferred platform for financial disclosures, with 30.24 
percent of tweets versus 16.8 percent of posts dealing with financial disclosures, of 
which segment information made up 7.14 percent of disclosure tweets (8.33 percent of 
Facebook posts), 22.47 percent of tweets (7.33 percent of Facebook posts) were 
related to financial reviews of the company with a small percentage (0.54) of tweets 
dealing with stock price information versus 1.15 percent of Facebook posts. Of those 
disclosure tweets not classified as financial disclosures, 3.6 percent were about general 
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corporate information, 2.02 percent on corporate strategy, 2.72 percent on acquisitions 
and disposals, 10.6 percent on research and development and 0.52 on future prospects 
for  a total of 19.46 percent overall dealing with strategic disclosure messages. The 
majority of disclosure tweets dealt with either information about directors (23.86 
percent) or social policy and value added information (18 percent), with the remainder 
(8.44 percent) related to employee information. Zhou et al. (2015) find that financial 
disclosures messages are the fastest-growing type of disclosure messages on Twitter 
between 2009 and 2013, while non-financial disclosure messages are the fastest 
growing disclosures on Facebook for the same time period.  
2.3 Investors’ Use of Social Media 
Companies can and do use social media in a variety of ways, from advertising to 
soliciting feedback from customers. The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
different communication channels influence retail investors.  Prior literature has shown 
that retail investors can influence stock prices (Barber and Odean 2008, Barber et al. 
2009, Burch et al. 2014, Hvidkjaer 2008, Kaniel et al. 2008, Kumar and Lee 2006). 
Small investors have been found to be net buyers of stocks after both good and bad 
earnings news, especially when the magnitude of the news is large (Hirschleifer et al. 
2008). Experimental research on different information channels and their influence on 
investors is limited, in particular on the influence of social media. Trinkle and Crossler 
(2014) find that investors’ reactions to good and bad news communicated over social 
media is influenced by the attached comments and that comments can change the 
valence of the news to the point where bad news disclosures were perceived as good 
news.  
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There are a few articles, mostly working papers, that investigate the role of social 
media in information dissemination and how investors are using the channels. Jung et 
al. (2014) show that trading volume increases after earnings announcement tweets  and 
that trades greater than $50,000 are the primary drivers of the increased trading 
volume, indicating that larger investors are reacting to the news via Twitter rather than 
small investors. Jung et al. (2014) argue that counter to the belief that social media 
“levels the playing field” for small investors, firms’ use of the platform for financial 
disclosures actually increases information asymmetry, since it is large investors that 
appear to be taking advantage of the earnings announcement tweets.  
Curtis et al. (2014) find that abnormally high levels of investor attention, as 
measured by social media activity, are associated with higher sensitivity to market 
returns to earnings news. In particular, high levels of attention increase sensitivity of 
returns by 234 percent for positive news and 91 percent for negative news. While low 
levels of investor attention are associated with significant post-earnings-announcement 
drift, but not for firms with normal to high levels of investor attention. These results are 
robust to traditional measures of attention to earnings announcements. Additionally, 
high investor attention is found to increase the sensitivity of returns to earnings when 
firms announce earnings pre-market opening, along with decreasing the post-earnings 
announcement drift. The opposite effect is found for firms that announce after the 
market closes. Looking at the sentiment of tweets, the authors find higher market 
returns for the group with the highest optimism on the day of the earnings 
announcement; these results are robust to the inclusion of media attention, proxied for 
by Dow Jones Newswires, financial blogs, and Google searches. 
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Helms and Werder (2013), analyzing the compositions of social networks around 
Europe’s twenty-five largest software vendors, find that firms have a small internal 
audience but a large external audience, and the followers of the companies are distinct 
and unique from each of the other companies analyzed. An AMO Global Survey (2014) 
of 105 institutional investors from 12 countries reports that corporate websites are more 
respected and used than corporate social media sites. Thirty-three percent of the 
investors surveyed indicated that they use social media as a “heads up” and in 
exceptional situations. Possibly the reason institutional investors do rely on social media 
is that 85 percent of surveyed investors said social media sites are not reliable, similar 
to the finding by Oh et al. (2013) with only 17 percent responding that social media is 
usually reliable. Institutional investors did believe that social media would grow in 
importance for financial communications. The AMO survey revealed that professional 
investor use of social media varied widely by region, with 40 percent of USA based 
investors consulting social media very frequently compared to France and Poland 
where 80 percent of the surveyed investors never consult social media. However, 37 
percent of institutional investors regarded social media in financial communications as a 
welcome innovation, with 82 percent expecting the use of social media to grow in 
financial communications in coming years. Newswires were consulted very frequently 
by 76 percent of the respondents and was found to be always reliable 30 percent of the 
time and usually reliable 57 percent of the time. Newspapers are the second most 
widely consulted and slightly less trustworthy in the institutional investor with 61 percent 
consulting them frequently with 13 percent finding them always reliable and 66 percent 
rating them as usually reliable. Corporate websites were considered the most reliable, 
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with 42 percent of respondents rating them as always reliable and 50 percent rating 
them as usually reliable. However, corporate websites are consulted less frequently, 
with only 36 percent doing so very frequently and 31 percent frequently visiting globally. 
However, 90 percent of institutional investors in the United States consult corporate 
websites very frequently, with 70 percent considering the websites as usually reliable 
and 20 percent finding the sites as always reliable. Investors in the United States lead in 
relying on Twitter professionally, with 40 percent doing so regularly and another 40 
percent doing so occasionally. Fewer US based investors consult Facebook 
professionally with 72 percent never doing so and only 10 doing so occasionally.  
Prior literature has shown that even small changes to how financial information is 
presented can impact investors.  Hodge et al. (2010) experimentally show that the 
presentation of related financial information in close proximity on a page has a positive 
influence on investors, and that the presentation of related financial information on 
different pages has a negative effect.  
In similar vein, Maines and McDaniels (2000) find that nonprofessional investors’ 
judgments of management performance only reflect the volatility of comprehensive 
income when comprehensive income is disclosed in its own statement and not in the 
statement of stockholders equity. Elliot et al. (2012) find that investors recommend 
investing different amounts in a company after a financial restatement, depending on 
whether the CEO announces the restatement via text or video. The Elliot et al. (2012) 
experiment simulated an investor getting all their information from the company’s 
investor relations website, by providing participants with financial press releases only 
from the company and then having them read the text of the announcement or watch a 
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video of it. It is unclear what investors’ responses would have been had Elliot’s 
information been posted on less traditional media, such as Twitter and Facebook, and 
investors had to process the additional cues inherent to social media. The additional 
cues may cause investors to assess the disclosure credibility of press releases 
differently, which in turn could lead participants to make different decisions.   
2.4 Firm Strategies around Good and Bad News 
Prior research has investigated company disclosure of two types of financial 
information--positive and negative. Empirical evidence suggests that managers disclose 
bad news to reduce litigation and reputational costs (Skinner 1994, Suijs 2005, 2007, 
Ge and Lennox 2011). Since large investors do not like to be surprised, managers can 
mitigate loss of institutional ownership and analyst coverage by releasing bad news 
early (Skinner 1994).  Soffer et al. (2000) find that managers in possession of bad news 
release all the information at the preannouncement date versus managers with good 
news who only release a portion of the good news at the preannouncement date. Firms 
with negative earnings surprises have lower excess returns both before and after the 
earnings announcement (Soffer et al. 2000). The finding of negative earnings surprises 
having lower excess returns is consistent with managers’ having differential disclosure 
strategies for good and bad news and Soffer et el. (2000) posit that how information is 
presented to the market can influence the reaction to the information.  
Suijs (2007) proposes an analytical model of voluntary disclosure showing that a 
partial disclosure equilibrium is possible when firms disclose negative or bad information 
to the market and find support for proprietary costs influencing disclosure decisions. 
Although managers tend to disclose negative information, they still resist doing so until it 
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is necessary (Kothari et al. 2009, Dye 2010), as compared to good news where they 
disclose up to half of it early (Ge and Lennox 2011). Additionally, the market is aware of 
managers’ resistance to full disclosure and responds accordingly to predictable 
managerial bias in forecasts (Rogers and Stocken 2005). 
Empirical research finds that firms are more likely to tweet good earnings news 
than bad earnings news (Jung et al. 2014). However, most firms use social media 
inconsistently, with only 6 percent of S&P 1500 firms consistently doing so. Additionally, 
Jung et al. (2014) find that the market responds to the news, as evidenced by the three-
day signed returns being higher, the absolute return being lower, and the bid-ask 
spread being higher for firms releasing earnings announcements via social media. 
Additionally, the market responds positively to firms that consistently release earnings 
news over social media (Jung et al. 2014). 
Bhagwat and Burch (2014) find that firms whose frequency of tweets is greater 
than the median number of tweets earn higher post-earnings announcement returns 
than before they joined Twitter. When the positive surprise from a firm is small, 
increased tweets, both in general and financial specific, are associated with higher post-
announcement returns for all periods investigated by Bhagwat and Burch, that is the 
before, during and after earnings announcements windows. It is only for the small 
positive surprises that they find the association and it is particularly pronounced for low 
visibility firms, as proxied by size and analyst following. The authors also find that firms 
with small earnings surprises have greater financial tweet intensity in the post-
announcement window, suggesting that firms attempt to strategically focus investor 
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attention when efforts are more likely to influence returns. The authors find that strategic 
tweeting is more pronounced for firms that more often engage in earnings management.  
Investigating press releases related to product and services (P&S), Liu et al. 
(2014) find that firms with market capitalizations below the median are more likely to 
release P&S press releases during the earnings announcement window. The likelihood 
of a P&S press release is 80 percent higher if the firms’ reported earnings are in the 
bottom decile of firms. If the firm is small, the odds increase to 90 percent that the firm 
will release P&S information during the earnings announcement window. Over 80 
percent of P&S press releases announce the signing of new business contracts or the 
release of new products, suggesting that firms time the release of good news, albeit not 
earnings related, in an attempt to mitigate the effect of negative earnings news. The 
authors find that firms releasing non-earnings information benefit the firm, especially 
when it comes to garnering media attention, with the media three times more likely to 
cover a P&S press release during the earnings announcement window and is four times 
more likely to cover the P&S press release if the earnings news is extremely negative. 
Additionally, if the press picks up the P&S news, even if only one media article is 
produced on the P&S for the firm, then announcement returns are 6 percent higher for 
firms in the bottom quintile of negative earnings surprises. The positive response does 
reverse over 60 days showing that investors overreact to the good media coverage. 
Overall, the findings of Liu et al. (2014) are concentrated in smaller cap firms. This 
finding indicates that firms strategically bundle good news with the bad earnings news, 
similar to Dye (2013), but that the strategy works especially well if the media covers the 
good news. 
27 
Other studies have looked at the role social media has played in product recalls 
and how firms use social media to disseminate information around the event. Lee et al. 
(2015) find that stock price reaction around firms with a social media presence, which 
they broadly define as corporate blogs, RSS, Facebook or Twitter accounts, is less 
pronounced than without a social media presence. Additionally, the authors find the 
attenuation benefits from social media are significantly lower from Facebook and Twitter 
than from those provided by corporate blogs and RSS feeds. Lee et al. argue that the 
lower attenuation benefits from Facebook and Twitter is due to the firms’ diminished 
control over the content on those platforms. Lee et al. (2015) show that negative market 
reactions to a recall can be exacerbated by the number of tweets about the recall by 
other users but attenuated by the number of tweets by the firm, indicating that firms still 
have some credibility with the public even after a recall when credibility is low.  
However, while Jung et al. and Blankespoor et al. (2014) find that the market 
responds positively to firms’ use of social media as measured by abnormal returns, they 
find contrary evidence around bid-ask spreads. Both studies are archival studies and 
cannot explain why the use of social media by firms results in their findings, nor how 
social media platforms are perceived as financial disclosure platforms absent good or 
bad news. In particular, the studies above cannot explain why small investors are not 
responding to earnings announcement via social media but larger investors are (Jung et 
al. 2014) nor why Twitter and Facebook do not have the same attenuating influence on 
the market as corporate blogs and RSS feeds (Lee et al. 2015).  
The evidence is mixed on the use of social media for financial information 
disclosure. Joyce (2012), Barnes and Lescault (2012) and Brunswick Group (2012) find 
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that companies and investors are using social media for various uses including 
dissemination and aggregation of financial information. However, Barnes and Lescault 
(2012) find that companies are unsure of how best to leverage social media. Jung et al. 
(2014) report that little over half of the S&P 1500 firms have either a corporate 
Facebook page or Twitter account, but only 6 percent regularly release quarterly 
earnings announcements.  I propose that the reason firms are unsure of how to use 
social media, especially for financial disclosures, is that retail investors perceive 
financial information posted on social media sites differently from the same information 
posted on more traditional sites and thereby respond in a manner that firms are not 
accustomed to. I test this theory using the Elaboration Likelihood Model. 
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3.0 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Product Channel Fit 
The theory of product-channel fit was proposed by Bang et al. (2013) as an 
extension of the marketing theory of channel capabilities attributed to Avery et al. 
(2013).  A channel capability is “an enabling characteristic of channel that allows 
consumers to accomplish their shopping goals” (Avery et al. 2013 p.96-97).  Testing the 
addition of a mobile channel to an established online channel for an e-retailer in Korea, 
Bang et al. (2013) find that the performance impact of an additional channel depends 
upon the product characteristics and the subsequent product-channel fit. A 
characteristic of a company investor relations web page is that it is a Web 1.0 
technology, in that it only allows one-way flow of information, from the company to the 
consumer. Twitter and other social media technologies employ Web 2.0 technology, in 
which sociality between the company and the customer, between customer and 
customer, or three-way conversations between participants around user-generated 
content is possible.  
Communication is a core dimension of both Web 1.0 and 2.0 platforms, but not 
all platforms are equal in information, collaboration, and relationships (Fauser et al. 
2011). For example, social networks are mostly used to maintain relationships whereas 
wikis are mainly for collaboration. Microblogs, such as Twitter, have the characteristic of 
being highly effective in terms of reach and timeliness, but are ineffective for in-depth 
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consumer information (Fauser et al. 2011). Consequently, not all platforms are equally 
suitable, i.e. a “good fit,” for all information available to post on the web.  I extend 
product-channel fit theory from the context of fit between physical products and 
purchase channels to the fit between information and communication channel. I argue 
that investors who view a communication channel as being highly relevant and a good 
fit for the information disseminated on the channel will incorporate that information into 
their decision making. Compared to investors that view a communication channel as 
being irrelevant, or a poor fit, for obtaining information will not use the information in 
their decision making process. Furthermore, investors who find the platform a good fit, 
for the dissemination of financial information are less likely to experience message 
discrepancy between the channel and the information. By contrast, investors who 
perceive the channel to be a poor fit for spreading financial information are more likely 
to experience message discrepancy. Message discrepancy may in turn cue or prompt 
the investor to process the information unconsciously. One way to measure if investors 
process information consciously or unconsciously is through the use of dual process 
theories (Chaiken and Trope 1999, Evans 2008), such as the elaboration likelihood 
model. I test whether product-channel fit influences retail investors’ perceptions of the 
release of financial information and use Elaboration Likelihood Model for explaining how 
good fit and poor fit manifest themselves in the way the information is processed by the 
investor. 
3.2 Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) is a dual processing theory, which posits 
that influence travels through two routes—the central route and the peripheral route. 
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The route is based on the type of information processed by a user, so that task-relevant 
arguments follow a central or conscious route, while secondary (less-relevant) cues 
follow the peripheral or unconscious route. The central and peripheral routes are 
different in at least two ways. First, different types of information are processed on each 
route. Arguments or information relevant to an individual’s particular decision, such as 
whether to invest in a particular stock, are processed on the central route. Information 
that is irrelevant to the decision but still influences the decision represent tangential 
cues that get processed on the peripheral route. Secondary irrelevant cues foster 
message discrepancy and as such influence peripheral route processing (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986). Second, the central route requires higher cognitive effort, due to the 
information processing that is required, compared to the peripheral route.  
The central route is akin to how we expect a strictly rational human (e.g. homo 
economicus) to approach a problem: thoughtful comprehension of the arguments, their 
quality evaluated, followed by a synthesis of conflicting arguments to form an overall 
judgment. The peripheral route only requires associations with salient positive or 
negative cues related to the object (Petty el al. 1981). Finally, perception/attitude 
changes that occur via the central route are, in general, more stable, more enduring, 
and are more predictive of long-term behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Changes that 
occur via the peripheral route are less persistent, open to counter influence, and less 
predictive of future behavior. 
ELM explains the circumstances under which information consumers may be 
more influenced by one route than the other, and posits that there are different long-
term effects of each route (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Prior research has assumed that 
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investors process information on the central route as they seek to determine the 
fundamental value of a firm. Further, research has shown that the presentation format of 
financial information results in different investment decisions, which contradict the 
wealth maximizing/rational man hypotheses and lend support to dual process theory at 
work in investing decisions (e.g. see Hodge et al. 2008, Maines and McDaniels 2000, 
Elliot et al. 2012). However, prior research on the topic of investor decision making has 
not provided a theory for the observed behavior. ELM appears to be uniquely suited to 
the exploration of the “black box” of influence within a financial reporting context, and 
may provide an explanation to prior observations.  
There has been little research in accounting using ELM or dual process theories, 
the notable exception being Farrell et al. (2014) where the effect of performance-based 
incentive contracts versus a fixed pay contract is investigated when managers are in a 
high affective state using the dual process theories’ general terms of System 1 and 
System 2 (Kahnemean and Frederick, Stanovich 1999). The authors find that in an 
emotional context, performance-based contracts invoke more System 2 processing than 
fixed wage contracts and decrease the proportion of economically costly choices. Much 
more accounting research has focused on the role affect plays in other accounting 
settings, such as managerial decision making (Kida et al. 2001, Moreno et al. 2002, 
Ding and Beaulieu 2011), management credibility (Mercer 2005), memory (Kida et al. 
1998, Rose 2001, Rose et al. 2004), ethical judgments of auditors (Cianci et al. 2009), 
and stock price judgments (Victoravich 2010).  
Information systems research has primarily investigated the role of ELM in 
technology acceptance (Bhattacharjee and Sanford 2006, Lee and Xia 2011, Li 2013), 
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website privacy (Lowry et al. 2012), web personalization (Tam and Ho 2005, Ho and 
Bodoff 2014), information system continuance (Chuang, et al. 2011),  online content 
influence on attitudes and buying intentions (Kumi and Limayem 2012), ERP systems 
(Jung et al. 2013), promotion of enterprise social networks (Abdulrahman and Darshana 
2014), and social media marketing (Chang et al. 2015). 
Affect does play a role in ELM but not in the way suggested by Farrell et al. 
(2014), who argue that System 1 or automatic processes are reliant upon affect and 
intuition.  Petty et al. (1998) argues that affect is a variable in ELM. Variables, such as 
affect, can influence individuals in four ways: (1) as a persuasive argument, (2) as a 
peripheral cue, (3) by influencing the extent or direction of argument processing, and (4) 
by biasing the elaboration (Petty and Wegener 1999). Variable have been theorized to 
serve in all four roles but no studies have shown this to be the case.  
Variables, such as affect, are then able to influence attitudes by different 
processes and take on different roles depending on where the variables are along the 
elaboration continuum. Variables play the role of peripheral cues when they are on the 
low end of the elaboration continuum, and as arguments or bias information processing 
when they are high on the elaboration continuum. Variables are most likely to influence 
the amount of thinking when they are in the middle of the elaboration continuum. Based 
on the multiple roles that variables, such as affect, play in ELM, it is unknown what route 
participants used in Mercer’s (2005) study, in which she finds that affective reactions 
significantly influence investors to change their perceptions of management’s reporting 
credibility in the long term but not in the short term. In fact, information processing on 
the central route is in general more, stable, enduring, and predictive of long-term 
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behavior.  In Mercer’s (2005) study participants indicate that they processed the 
affective information via the central route as it influenced their long-term perceptions of 
management credibility. The findings are contrary to what Farrell et al. (2014) argue 
should happen. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Social media generally refers to activities integrating electronic technologies with 
social interactions. A face-to-face social interaction is a multi-sensory experience, in 
which verbal, non-verbal and contextual signals are simultaneously processed by the 
communicating parties. The multiplicity of signals holds true in social media, with words, 
pictures, audio and even video now capable of being transmitted across various social 
media platforms intended either for all interested parties or to only one person. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that a company is a “nexus of contracts.” Following logically 
from the aforementioned definition, it would be inherently difficult, if not impossible, for a 
nexus of contracts to be social. A combination of a non-social actor, such as a 
company, being on platforms dedicated to increasing social interaction, could be an 
inconsistency associated with the message source (i.e., the company). Inconsistencies 
between the message and the receiver’s beliefs and knowledge are referred to as 
message discrepancy. Message discrepancy is a cue that could cause the message to 
be processed on the peripheral route by the message receiver.  Following ELM, 
message discrepancy cues lead to cognitive dissonance which causes the message to 
be processed on the peripheral route instead of the central route. In my experiment, I 
test whether a low product-channel fit is associated with message discrepancy, as 
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measured by the degree to which financial information released on Twitter is processed 
by participants on the peripheral route. 
ELM suggests that argument quality (via the central route) and peripheral cues 
(via the peripheral route) directly influence attitude and belief change. Argument quality 
refers to the persuasive strength of arguments that are embedded in a message. 
Peripheral cues refer to the message source but do not refer to the message’s 
embedded arguments. Peripheral cues used in the ELM literature often rely on the 
environmental characteristics of the message, such as perceived credibility of source, 
quality of presentation, attractiveness of the source, or in the case of marketing, if the 
slogan is easily remembered (i.e., ”catchy”). Disclosure credibility is defined as the 
extent to which a disclosure is perceived to be believable by information recipients 
(Mercer 2004, 2005).  Following Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I measure 
disclosure credibility and attitude to establish whether social media causes messages to 
be processed using the peripheral route. 
To establish the extent to which participants use the central route, I measure 
argument quality and perceived usefulness. Argument quality refers to the ability to 
persuade or the strength of the argument embedded in a message. Perceived 
usefulness refers to the degree to which a person believes using a specific system 
would enhance job performance (Davis 1989). Message arguments are intended to be 
processed rationally by users rather than emotionally, argument quality is expected to 
influence perceived usefulness of an information channel in financial reporting situations 
where the information is relevant to an individual’s investing decision.  
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Figure 1 Research Model 
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Likewise, my measure of peripheral cue--disclosure credibility of a message--is 
expected to influence attitude, as both cues appeal to human affect rather than rational 
judgment. Both measures are expected to be influenced by the message discrepancy of 
companies, who are non-social actors, posting information to a social site.  
Companies that post financial information on social media channels must utilize a 
disclosure bundle since Facebook and Twitter have inherent limitations. For example, in 
the case of Twitter only 140 characters are allowed. Accordingly, company financial 
announcements on Twitter are generally headlines with a link to the full press release 
about the announcement on the company’s investor relations page.  Using the ELM 
theoretical framework, I test for differences between Twitter and the corporate investor 
relations web page in links between constructs indicative of central route processing or 
peripheral route processing.  In the ELM research model (Figure 1), evidence of central 
route processing stems from argument quality, influencing perceived usefulness which 
in turn influences the eventual judgment or decision. By contrast, evidence of peripheral 
route processing stems from disclosure credibility influencing attitude which in turn 
influences the eventual judgment or decision.  I predict that retail investors viewing 
press releases on Twitter will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing, while retail 
investors viewing press releases on the investor relations web page will exhibit stronger 
central route processing. Formally, I hypothesize as follows: 
H1:  Participants viewing financial disclosures on Twitter (IR web 
page) will exhibit stronger peripheral (central) route 
processing than central (peripheral) route processing. 
 Financial reporting credibility can be decomposed into disclosure credibility and 
management credibility (Mercer 2004, 2005). Disclosure credibility has been defined as 
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the believability of a particular disclosure as perceived by investors. Disclosure 
credibility is appraised independently for each disclosure, and thus may vary by different 
disclosures within the same firm. Management credibility is defined as managers’ 
competence and trustworthiness as perceived by investors. ELM does not make any 
predictions about the influence different routes will have on an individuals’ end decision.  
Rather, ELM only predicts that the route does influence the final decision or judgment. 
In this study, participants’ judgment is management credibility. The cognitive 
dissonance caused by the message discrepancy of a non-social actor (i.e., the 
company) posting information to a social platform is expected to influence participants’ 
judgments of management competence and trustworthiness.  The formal hypothesis 
follows: 
H2: Participants will judge management as less credible when 
viewing financial disclosures posted on the company’s Twitter 
feed than on the company’s investor relations web page. 
The elaboration likelihood model argues that the influences of argument quality 
and disclosure credibility are contingent upon potential users’ motivation and ability to 
elaborate on informational messages (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Following 
Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I operationalize the motivation dimension of the ELM 
as relevance. Relevance is defined as investors’ perceptions of the relevance of using 
either a company’s Twitter feed or company investor relations web page to obtain 
financial information. I operationalize the ability to elaborate on financial information as 
investors’ investing experience. Expert or experienced investors are more skeptical of 
new information related to companies and identify key information quicker and with less 
cognitive effort than less experienced investors. Experienced investors will be less 
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swayed by peripheral cues compared to inexperienced investors, since experienced 
investors tend to be more aware of the possibility of inaccuracy or management bias. 
Expert investors’ superior knowledge, formed over time and with experience, reduces 
the influence of peripheral cues, since they know that they can form more accurate 
perceptions of the company by critically examining the press releases. In comparison, 
novice or less expert users are more prone to the influence of peripheral cues such as 
disclosure credibility, rather than the facts or message arguments contained in the 
communication, in framing their attitude and perceptions that form their perceived 
usefulness judgments.  
Prior literature has mainly focused on the credibility of the disclosure from 
management and the consequences a credible disclosure has on the market (Williams 
1996, Hirst et al. 1999). Jennings (1987) finds that the reaction of investors to earnings 
forecasts is dependent upon how unexpected the forecast is and how credible or 
believable it is. Jennings finds that forecasts with the same level of surprise but with 
different levels of credibility will elicit different responses from investors, with the more 
credible forecast causing greater investor belief changes, revisions to portfolios, and 
changes to security prices. Hutton et al. (2003) find that bad news earnings forecasts 
are always considered informative by the market but that good news forecasts are 
informative only if they include credible forward looking statements. Kothari et al. (2009) 
conclude that prior studies have interpreted the evidence of positive and negative news 
as either managers accelerating the release of bad news or the market viewing bad 
news disclosures as more credible. Kothari et al. (2009) posit that market participants 
may find disclosures of bad news to be more credible than disclosures of good news, as 
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management has various incentives to embellish news (Rogers and Stocken 2005). 
Additionally, prior literature has documented that companies are hesitant to release 
negative information on social media platforms, even if doing so would increase their 
credibility (Jung et al. 2014). Alternatively, the interaction of negative news with the 
cognitive dissonance caused by a non-social entity posting to a social platform could 
cause participants (both experienced and less experienced investors) to perceive 
disclosure credibility as low, as they seek to alleviate the dissonance, and the negative 
news would provide further justification for doing so. On the other hand, information on 
social media has been shown to be subject to rumors and misinterpretations (Oh et al. 
2013).  Consequently, good and bad news posted on social media could be perceived 
as being less useful to retail investors and thus influence their attitude towards the use 
of the media for releasing financial information.  Investors, especially those investors 
with more investing experience, should have more negative associations with the 
platform since they are accustomed to seeing financial information released on more 
traditional platforms, such as the company’s investor relations web page. The decrease 
in argument quality, and subsequent reduction in perceived usefulness, could temper 
investor judgments and decisions. I argue that social media moderates investors’ 
responses to both good and bad news, as disclosure credibility influences multiples 
constructs, which in turn influence judgments and decisions. To test the aforementioned 
argument, I compare the overall models for each news condition against all other news 
conditions. The formal hypothesis is as follows: 
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H3: Social media (Twitter) will moderate the effect of positive or 
negative financial news attenuating the judgments of retail 
investors, compared to the same news released on traditional 
media (IR web site). 
 
Following the research model proposed by Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), I test 
each model for differences across the following conditions: Twitter and good news, 
Twitter and bad news, company investor relations web site with good news, and 
company investor relations web site with bad news. Empirical testing of the hypotheses 
is described in the next section.  
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4.0 METHOD 
I test the hypotheses using an experiment employing a 2 x 2 disclosure channel 
by news type between-subjects design. The first factor of disclosure channel has two 
conditions: Twitter feed or company investor relations site. The second factor is news 
type and is operationalized as whether the company beats (good) or misses (bad) 
analyst forecasts for the annual report.  
4.1 Experimental Participants 
The participants were 807 retail investors recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (average years investing was 6.00, average age was 33.11 years, average work 
experience was 11.85 years) living in North America. Each was paid $1 to participate in 
the study3. Participants could not participate in the study unless they answered in the 
affirmative that they had bought or sold stocks in the past 12 months. Recent studies 
have found that data collected through online crowdsourcing applications, such as 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, does not differ substantially from the more traditional 
methods of data collection of panels and student proxies (Steelman et al. 2014, Farkas 
and Murthy 2013, Farrell et al. 2014). I randomly assigned participants to experimental 
conditions, and participants in all conditions completed the experiment online. 
                                            
3 Participants on average took 14 minutes and 15 seconds to complete the study. The compensation of 
$1 thus equates to an average hourly wage of $4.20. 
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4.2 Case Materials and Procedures 
Modifying the case from Elliot et al. (2012), I instructed participants to assume 
the role of a member of a local investment club and that they had been asked at the last 
club meeting to monitor, evaluate, and make a recommendation to the club regarding 
one company, Lafarge S.A.4 Lafarge is a real world publicly traded company on the 
Paris stock exchange under the ticker symbol LG, and is an international producer of 
cement, gypsum wallboard, and related products. Lafarge S.A., was chosen due to its 
extensive posting on Twitter of investor-related links, financial information, and non-
investor related material. The company also has a Facebook page and investor 
relations page on the company website. Lafarge stock is not traded on any North 
American stock exchange and is primarily a business-to-business enterprise, so 
participant familiarity with the company is expected to be similar to a fictitious company, 
despite being the world’s largest cement manufacturer. A post-experiment questionnaire 
shows that participants were not familiar with Lafarge with an overall average of 1.73 on 
a 7 point Likert scale, where 1 equals “Not at all familiar,” and 7 equals “Very familiar.”  
Following Elliot et al. (2012), I informed participants that they would view press 
releases that the company had released on popular investor relation sites during 2012 
and 2013. They were then to use this information to make and justify a recommendation 
to the club of whether it should increase or decrease its investment in Lafarge. Lafarge’s 
actual press releases were shown as screenshots to participants. The HTML code for 
each page used in the study (press releases, Lafarge Twitter and Facebook pages, and 
                                            
4 Elliott et al. (2012) used executives M.B.A. students for participants and had simulated participants 
working for an investment firm. The participants for the current study are retail investors so the use of a 
local investment club is more appropriate while still providing the benefits of following a previously 
published study. 
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the investor relations page) was first downloaded then altered to reduce the complexity 
of the web pages. For example, ads were removed from the Reuters page, and the 
current stock price of the company from the investor page. The Twitter page for the 
company was altered to show only eight posts from the company from the thousands of 
tweets that the company had posted up to that time5. Screenshots were then taken of 
each page to increase external validity, but also to remove the possibility that 
participants would click on hyperlinks and not complete the study. Longer press 
releases were built by taking multiple screenshots of the press release, and then 
stitching them together using Adobe Photoshop. Participants were shown all five press 
releases in the same order. 
4.3 Initial Exercise 
Participants began by reading a profile of Lafarge. Taken from Bloomberg 
Business Week, the profile stated that Lafarge is a worldwide company, founded in 
1833, and is traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. The profile also provided financial 
ratios for Lafarge versus the industry average, number of employees and the countries 
in which Lafarge operates. Next, participants viewed either Lafarge’s Twitter feed or the 
company’s investor page. Eight posts from Lafarge’s verified Twitter feed about press 
releases were shown on each page. Twitter and Facebook pages had the hashtags 
#Press #release, in front of each headline and a shortened URL at the end of the 
message that took them to the press release on the company investor relations page. 
For example, #Press #release 2012 full year results http://t.co/4cL7xsZn. For the 
company investor relations page, the hashtags and the shortened URL, items that are 
                                            
5 As of 3/11/15 Lafarge S.A. Twitter handle @LafargeGroup had 6,335 tweets. 
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unique to social media platforms, were removed to maintain internal validity. The 
removed information was visible elsewhere on the page; the slight wording differences 
in the headings are not expected to have a significant effect on the results. Although the 
complete headlines are not exactly the same, the primary headlines are the same. The 
choice not to include platform specific information, such as hashtags and URLs, was 
made to strengthen the internal validity of the experiment.6 Specifically, the additional 
information would only increase mundane realism7 and could increase the complexity of 
the experiment for participants, potentially biasing against finding results (Hodge et al. 
2008).  
 After viewing the page of press release headlines, participants in the good and 
bad news conditions saw the press release from 7/27/2012 announcing Lafarge Q2 
2012 results from the companies’ investor relations page was shown. Participants were 
then shown the press release headlines page. The pattern of headlines page followed 
by the press release on the company investor relations page, was repeated for three 
more press releases, one announcing a sale of assets in the United States, one 
announcing construction materials company. A Reuters story on the Lafarge’s fourth 
quarter results was then shown. The press release announced that earnings had either 
beat or missed analyst expectations. The press releases for quarters two and three do 
not mention analyst expectations and whether they are met or not, so the 
announcement of beating or missing expectations was meant as a surprise to the 
                                            
6 See Appendix A for example of headlines shown in both conditions. 
7 Peecher and Solomon (2001) argue that increasing “mundane” realism in experiments can be 
detrimental to internal validity if it distracts the participants from the constructs in question. 
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investors. Participants were then shown the press release from Lafarge for the fourth 
quarter, and were asked to make a recommendation to the investment club.  
4.4 Management Credibility 
I informed participants that the club’s current investment in Lafarge was 1,000 
shares. Following Tan and Koonce (2011), I asked “How attractive is Lafarge as an 
investment?” for the judgment question. For the decision question, I asked “By what 
number of shares do you recommend the club change its current 1,000 share 
investment in Lafarge S.A.?” following Elliott et al. (2011).  Participants indicated their 
recommendation on a slider scale with a floor of -1,000 and a ceiling of 1,000. 
Participants were next asked, “How long do you recommend the investment club hold 
its investment in Lafarge S.A.?” Participants indicated their recommendation on a slider 
scale with a floor of 0 months and a ceiling of 120 months with 12 month intervals. 
Participants were then asked to list between one and three key factors supporting their 
recommendations. Finally, management credibility was assessed using the following 
questions from Nelson and Rupar (2014). I asked “I think Lafarge S.A.’s management 
has the competence necessary to make clear and unbiased financial disclosures on 
Twitter/the company’s website.” Then I asked, “I trust Lafarge S.A.’s management to 
make clear and unbiased financial disclosures on Twitter/the company’s website.” 
Competence and trustworthiness have been shown to be the main factors that make up 
management credibility in prior literature (Mercer 2005).  
4.4 ELM Measures and Post-Experimental Questions 
After making their recommendations, participants answered one manipulation 
check question (a recall question). All participants then responded to a series of 
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questions designed to measure attributes that make up the ELM. Questions and their 
theoretical basis are described in the next section. Finally, participants answered how 
frequently they used the platform that displayed the press release headings, what 
broker they use to trade with, how much the broker charges per trade, and provided 
demographic information.  
4.5 Dependent Variables 
Management credibility is the main variable of interest and was measured using 
two questions, one related to management’s credibility the other related to 
management’s trustworthiness. Both questions were measured on an 11 point Likert 
scale, on which 1 equaled “strongly disagree” and 11 equaled “strongly agree.”  
I am using ELM as a lens in this study to determine how retail investors process 
financial information from different channels and how those processes influence 
investor’s perception of management credibility. However, it is also important to 
determine what consequences investor’s perception of management credibility has. 
Mercer (2005) finds a link between cognitive reactions and change in management’s 
reporting credibility in the short term, while affective reactions have a strong link to 
changes in management’s reporting credibility in the long term. In both determinants 
models change in management’s reporting credibility significantly influences investors’ 
willingness to rely on subsequent disclosure (a judgment). I measure investor 
judgments and decisions using three measures.  Investor judgment was measured 
using the question regarding the attractiveness of Lafarge as an investment, on an 11 
point Likert scale, on which 1 equaled “very unattractive” and 11 equaled “very 
attractive,” matching the terms and scale used by Tan and Koonce (2011). Investor 
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decisions were measured using two questions. First, by the number of shares by which 
participants recommended to the club to either increase, up to 1000 shares, or 
decrease, down to 0 or -1000 shares, in its investment in Lafarge. Second, by 
participants recommendation of how many months the investment club should hold 
Lafarge’s stock. Length of investment was measured on a slider scale, starting at 0, with 
a maximum of 120 with 12 month intervals in between. 
4.6 Process Variables 
The ELM identifies the route through which individuals process persuasive 
messages. Central route processing is measured using argument quality and perceived 
usefulness. Peripheral route processing is measured using disclosure credibility and 
attitude. Argument quality was measured using four Likert scaled items validated by 
Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006), which measured the extent to which participants 
believed the information provided by each platform was informative, helpful, valuable, 
and persuasive. Disclosure credibility was assessed using a modified version of 
Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s (2006) four-item Likert scale for source credibility. Two 
items from the original scale that examined participants’ perception of the disclosure’s 
trustworthiness and credibility were retained. The terms “knowledgeable” and “appeared 
to be an expert” were dropped and replaced with “honest” and “reliable.” The latter 
change was necessary since Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s experiment dealt with the 
persuasiveness of an individual, while this experiment deals with the credibility of an 
organization’s financial statements. Therefore, the original questions were not logical in 
that context. Perceived usefulness was measured using four Likert scaled items 
developed and validated by Davis et al. (1989) that asked for participants’ perceptions 
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of productivity, performance, and effectiveness gains from venue acceptance, and 
overall usefulness. Attitude was measured using Taylor and Todd’s (1995) four-item 
semantic differential scale anchored between “bad…good,” “foolish…wise,” 
“unpleasant…pleasant,” and “like…dislike” adjective pairs for the question, “using 
(Twitter, company investor website) for the task performed is a....” Relevance was 
assessed using a modified version of Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s (2006) two-item 
Likert scale.  An additional term “necessary” was added to the terms “important” and 
“relevant (appropriate)” and the wording “from my job” was dropped from each term. 
Validation of the aforementioned scales above is described in the next section. 
User experience was measured using the average of investing experience, work 
experience and age. The investing experience variable is participants' open ended 
response to the question of how many years of investing experience they had. The work 
experience variable measured how many years of professional work experience the 
participants had. Participants entered their age in years in a text box for the age 
variable. The variable Platform is a categorical variable where Twitter equals 1 and 
company website equals 0. The News type variable is a categorical variable where 
good news equals 1 and bad news equal 0. 
4.7 Control Variables 
Participant familiarity with the disclosure platform was measured with the 
question, “How often do you visit (use) company websites/Twitter feed?” using a 7 point 
Likert scale anchored by “Never” and “A great deal.” Accounting knowledge was 
measured by the number of accounting classes participants had taken post high school. 
General business knowledge was measured as a continuous variable of the number of 
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business classes taken post high school. I measured participants' familiarity with 
Lafarge using a 7 point Likert scale anchored between “Not at all familiar” and “Very 
familiar.”  
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5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Memory Test 
To assess participants’ attention levels, I asked, “Did Lafarge S.A., meet, beat or 
miss analyst forecasts in the fourth quarter?” Sixty-six percent (532 out of 807) of 
participants correctly answered this question before answering the fifteen latent variable 
measure questions, but after the five questions related to the recommendation to the 
investment club and management credibility, and reading the company’s fourth quarter 
press release. The announcement that Lafarge missed or beat earnings was in the 
headline of the Reuters article and was also in the second headline of the article. The 
moderately high correct response rate is acceptable considering the number of 
distracting items of information between the manipulation information and the question. 
Similar results were found when participants were asked the multiple choice question 
“Assets = Liabilities + _____” and had to choose from either Stockholder’s Equity, 
Revenue, Net Income, Long Term Liabilities at the end of the post experiment 
questionnaire. Out of 807 responses, 491 people correctly answered the question for a 
60.84 percent correct response rate. Participants also paid little attention to how many 
followers the Lafarge S.A. had on their Twitter feed (7,713). Only 233 out of 406, or 
57.25 percent, viewed the Twitter feed correctly and answered that Lafarge had 
between 5,000 and 10,000 followers. Westerman et al. (2012) finds that Twitter users 
with approximately 7,000 followers had the highest credibility estimates from 
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participants. Thus, indicating that Lafarge S.A. had 7,713 followers, within the range 
specified by Westerman et al. (2012), biases against finding results for disclosure 
credibility and the construct’s subsequent influence on attitude. Excluding participants 
who failed one or more of the memory checks does not materially change any of the 
results reported below. In section 5.9, I report results using a reduced sample of only 
participants who passed the manipulation check questions. 
5.2 Scale Validation 
The Cronbach’s standardized alpha of the two item measure of management 
credibility was 0.846. For the 4-item measure of argument quality the Cronbach’s 
standardized alpha was 0.913. For the 4-item measure of disclosure credibility 
Cronbach’s standardized alpha was 0.954. Perceived usefulness was measured with 
four items with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.936. Attitude was measured on a 
4-item measure with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.912. Relevance was 
measured on a 3-item measure with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.915. User 
experience was measured with three items with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.896.  All measures have an alpha greater than 0.9 except User Experience which has 
an alpha that is 0.004 below 0.9, which constitutes excellent internal consistency (Kline 
2000). Therefore, the conditions for reliability are met. Table 1 presents the means, 
standard deviations, minimum and max for each measure along the unstandardized 
alpha score. 
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TABLE 1 Validation of Instrument 
Panel A: Question Used      
MANCR 
I think Lafarge S.A.’s management has the competence necessary to make 
clear and unbiased financial disclosures on the company’s (Twitter feed, 
company website). 
MANTR I trust Lafarge S.A.'s management to make clear and unbiased financial disclosures on the company's (Twitter feed, website). 
Financial information provided through the company’s (Twitter feed, website) is/was… 
AQ1 Informative      
AQ2 Helpful      
AQ3 Valuable      
AQ4 Persuasive      
Financial information provided through the company’s (Twitter feed, website) is/was… 
SCR1 Trustworthy     
SCR2 Credible    
SCR3 Honest 
    SCR4 Reliable 
    Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information (will)… 
USE1 Increase/Increased my productivity (e.g., make my work faster). 
USE2 Increase/Increased my performance (e.g., make my work better). 
USE3 Make (Made) me more effective (e.g., help me make better decisions). 
USE4 I found the company's (Twitter feed, website) to be useful for obtaining financial information. 
ATT1 Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information is/was a (Bad, Good) idea. 
ATT2 Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information is/was a (Foolish, Wise) idea. 
ATT3 Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information is/was a (Unpleasant, Pleasant) idea. 
ATT4 Overall, I (Dislike, Like) the idea of obtaining financial information from the company’s (Twitter feed, website). 
Using the company’s (Twitter feed, website) to obtain financial information was… 
REL1 Important      
REL2 Relevant (appropriate)     
REL3 Necessary      
AGE How old are you?      
EXP How many years of professional work experience do you have? 
INVEST How many years of investing experience do you have? 
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Panel B             
 Scale 
Item N 
Item 
Mean Item S.D. Min Max 
Standardized 
Alpha 
 AQ1 807 5.27 1.42 1 7 0.883 
 AQ2 807 5.12 1.44 1 7 0.872 
 AQ3 807 5.07 1.46 1 7 0.874 
 AQ4 807 4.62 1.54 1 7 0.919 
 Argument Quality     0.913  DCR1 807 4.88 1.38 1 7 0.935 
 DCR2 807 5.01 1.37 1 7 0.941 
 DCR3 807 4.96 1.32 1 7 0.945 
 DCR4 807 4.95 1.37 1 7 0.939 
 Disclosure Credibility    0.954  USE1 807 4.55 1.61 1 7 0.918 
 USE2 807 4.56 1.59 1 7 0.907 
 USE3 807 4.73 1.64 1 7 0.915 
 USE4 807 4.97 1.56 1 7 0.929 
 Perceived Usefulness    0.936  ATT1 807 5.03 1.57 1 7 0.862 
 ATT2 807 4.94 1.52 1 7 0.878 
 ATT3 807 4.82 1.50 1 7 0.929 
 ATT4 807 4.86 1.74 1 7 0.874 
 Attitude      0.912  REL1 807 4.96 1.63 1 7 0.945 
 REL2 807 5.13 1.56 1 7 0.892 
 REL3 807 4.67 1.78 1 7 0.896 
 Relevance     0.915  INVEST 807 6.00 6.45 0 42 0.951 
 EXP 807 11.85 9.37 0 52 0.797 
 AGE 807 33.12 10.35 18 73 0.793 
 User Expertise     0.896  
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the means of the dependent and independent variables 
discussed above, along with the Pearson correlations. Platform is a categorical variable 
coded as 1 if participants were shown the Twitter feed and 0 if shown the investor web 
page. News is a categorical variable coded as 1 if participants were shown the Reuters 
page announcing that Lafarge beat forecasts and 0 if Lafarge missed forecasts. Of 
particular interest is the negative correlation between the dependent variable 
management credibility and the process variables of attitude, disclosure credibility, 
perceived usefulness, argument quality, and relevance with platform. Also of interest is 
the positive and significant correlation between the dependent variables. The 
correlations partially support the hypotheses.  
5.4 Assumption Testing 
5.4.1 Assumptions for Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one is tested using structured equation modeling (SEM). This section 
presents the analysis of structured equation modeling assumptions. The analysis will be 
performed in SEM using the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method. The ML 
estimation method is a normal theory method in that ML assumes multivariate normality 
of continuous outcome variables. Three criteria must be met for multivariate normality:  
(1) all variables individual univariate distributions are normal, (2) the joint distribution of 
any pair of the variables is bivariate normal, (3) all bivariate scatterplots are linear, and 
the distribution of the residuals is homoscedastic. 
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Table 2 - Pearson Correlations 
             
  Variable1 Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 AQT 20.08 
                2 SCRT 19.80 0.68 
               3 USET 18.81 0.77 0.65 
              4 ATTT 19.65 0.69 0.65 0.79 
             5 RELT 14.75 0.72 0.60 0.80 0.79 
            6 MANSCR 15.00 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.54 0.45 
           7 REC 342.56 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.42 
          8 ATTRACT 7.36 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.55 0.68 
         9 TIMEREC 38.24 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.25 0.21 
        10 USER 4.41 0.31 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.01 
       11 FAMIL 1.74 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.12 0.14 
      12 ACCT 2.77 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.20 
     13 BUS 2.36 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.20 0.05 0.65 
    14 REVIEW 2.96 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 
   15 NEWS 0.50 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
  16 PLATFORM 0.50 -0.32 -0.15 -0.31 -0.28 -0.42 -0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.26 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 
 17 USER EXP 16.99 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.10 0.03 -0.01 
Coefficients in bold are significant at p < .10. Pearson correlations are below diagonal. 
1Variables are defined as follows: AQ = summed scores of four questions on argument quality, SCR = summed scores of four questions on source 
credibility,  USE = summed scores of three questions on source credibility, ATT = summed scores of four questions on attitude, RELT = summed scores of 
three questions on perceived relevance, REC = number of shares recommended to purchase, ATTRACT = attractiveness of Lafarge S.A. as an investment 
measured using a 11 point Likert scale, TIMEREC = number of months recommended to hold the stock, USER = frequency of use of platform measured 
using a 7 point Likert scale,  FAMIL = participant’s familiarity with Lafarge S.A.  measured using a 7 point Likert scale, ACCT = number of accounting 
classes taken post high school, BUS = number of business classes taken post high school, REVIEW =  participant’s frequency of reviewing company 
financial information measured using a 7 point Likert scale, NEWS = 1 if the participant saw information on the Reuters website about Lafarge beating 
analyst expectations, 0 if the participant saw information on the Reuters website about Lafarge missing analyst expectations, PLATFORM = 1 if the 
participant saw information on the Lafarge Twitter feed, 0 if the participant saw information on the Lafarge investor relations page,  USER EXP = the 
average work and investing experience and age . 
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The first criteria was examined by plotting the factor scores computed using a 
varimax rotation for argument quality, perceived usefulness, disclosure credibility, 
attitude and management credibility, along with attractiveness, recommendation and 
time recommendation. The normality assumption for each variable was tested using the 
Shapiro-Wilks test for each variable. The test revealed that the variables were not 
normally distributed. However, the Shapiro-Wilks test has been shown to be sensitive to 
slight departures from normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2012). So variables were 
plotted against the normal probability plot and verifying that the output for each variable 
is a straight diagonal line. The plots reveal that there is positive kurtosis in most of the 
variables. However, none of the variables have kurtosis values greater than 1 which is 
well below the absolute value of 10 suggested as a problem level by Kline (2011). To 
test for multivariate normality the factor scores from all five factors were added to 
together then plotted against the normal probability plot and verifying that the output is a 
straight diagonal line. The plot reveals that there is positive kurtosis. However, the 
kurtosis is small at 0.5 well under the absolute value of 10 proposed by Kline (2011). A 
Shapiro-Wilks test confirms that the data is not perfectly multivariate normal but the 
plots show that the data is very close. The ML estimation technique has been shown to 
be robust to departures from normality (Savalei 2010, Bagozzi and Yi 2012, Yuan et al. 
2012). Therefore, despite the variables failing the assumption of normal distribution, I 
will rely on the robustness of the ML estimation technique. 
5.4.2 Assumptions for Hypotheses Two and Three 
Hypotheses two and three are tested using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
test. ANOVA has three main assumptions: (1) independence of observations, (2) that 
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the dependent variable is normally distributed, (3) and equality of variance across 
groups . Independence of observations is ensured by no one participant taking the 
survey twice and participants being randomly assigned to the conditions. The 
dependent variable for hypotheses two and three is the sum of the two management 
credibility questions. The sum of the two values was plotted against the normal 
probability plot, and I verified that the output was a straight line. In addition, a Shapiro-
Wilks test was performed on the variable. The tests show that management credibility is 
not normally distributed due to positive kurtosis. However, the positive kurtosis is small 
at 0.06 and is negatively skewed at -0.48 and Shapiro-Wilks test is sensitive to slight 
departures normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2012). As kurtosis and skewness is quite 
small, the data is arguably normally distributed but not perfectly so. 
To test the second assumption of constant variance, a scatterplot of the residuals 
versus the predicted dependent variable, using a continuous independent variable 
(age), was created. There appeared to be no patterns to indicate unequal variance in 
the scatterplot. In addition to the scatterplot, Levene’s test was conducted. Levene’s test 
revealed the assumption of constant variance was not satisfied (p=0.0257).  However, 
ANOVA is robust to departures from normality and variance if the cell sizes are 
approximately equal. My cells have slightly over 200 to 203 observations each, so I will 
rely on the robustness of ANOVA in my testing of hypotheses two and three. 
5.5 Test of Hypothesis One 
The first hypothesis predicts that participants viewing press releases on Twitter 
will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing than central route processing, while 
participants viewing press releases on the company’s investor relations web page will 
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exhibit stronger central route processing than peripheral route processing. I test these 
predictions by conducting four structured equation model (SEM) analyses. The analyses 
test how participants’ process financial information released on different communication 
channels, and how the route the participants use affects participant’s perceptions of 
management credibility. The first SEM analysis examines participants’ route processing 
for information from the company’s investor relations page and the company missing 
analyst forecasts for the fourth quarter or bad news (Figure 2 Top Panel A). The second 
SEM analysis examines the routes processing for information from the company’s 
Twitter feed and the company missing forecasts (Figure 2 Bottom Panel A). The third 
SEM analysis shows the route processing for information from the company’s investor 
relations web page and the company beating analyst forecasts (Figure 2 Top Panel B). 
The fourth SEM analysis examines the route processing for information from the 
company’s Twitter feed and the company beating analyst forecasts (Figure 2 Bottom 
Panel B).  
The data appear to fit the model well. For all models, the comparative fit indices 
(CFIs) are all greater than 0.93, suggesting good model fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
Following the methods outlined in Loehlen (2004), I compared the constrained model for 
each condition to each unconstrained model and using a χ2 difference test to determine 
if the models are statistically different, I find that all models are statistically different from 
each other (χ2  min = 57.161, max = 92.075, two-tailed p < .01).  
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Figure 2 Processing Routes of Retail Investors by Platform and News Valence with Consequences 
Panel A: Platform by Bad News 
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Panel B: Platform by Good News 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, ** Indicates p < .01, .05 two-tailed respectively. NS indicates p > 0.10 two-tailed. Bold links are significant at p < .05. Parentheses 
indicate R2 values. Figure 2 reports the standardized regression coefficients for four structured equation model analyses examining 
(1) whether retail investors process financial information on the central route of argument quality and perceived usefulness or the 
peripheral route of source credibility and attitude, and (2) whether changes in management's reporting credibility affect investors' 
view of the attractiveness of the stock, how many shares of the stock they recommend buying and how long they recommend the 
shares be held. Participants' responses to argument quality, perceived usefulness, source credibility, attitude, and management 
credibility were measured using the questions outlined in Table 1. 
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Overall, H1 predicts that the links for the two models in the Twitter condition will 
have a significant link between the latent construct of attitude and management 
credibility, but not a significant link between perceived usefulness and management 
credibility. The opposite is predicted for the two models in the investor relations web 
page condition, with significant links expected between perceived usefulness and 
management credibility, but missing significant links between attitude and management 
credibility. Figure 2 shows all four conditions. The Twitter and good news model (Panel 
B) shows a significant link on the peripheral route between attitude and management 
credibility (β = 0.437, two-tailed p < 0.01), but not a significant link between perceived 
usefulness and management credibility (β = 0.142, p > 0.10). Compared to the investor 
relations web page and good news model that shows a significant link on the central 
route between perceived usefulness and management credibility (β = 0.673, p < .01), 
but not a significant link on the peripheral route between attitude and credibility.  
The Twitter and bad news model shows a significant link on the peripheral link 
between attitude and management credibility (β = 0.333, p < 0.01) and a significant link 
on the central route from perceived usefulness to management credibility (β= 0.394, p < 
0.01). By contrast, in the investor relations web page and good news model, the link 
from the central route from perceived usefulness to management credibility is significant 
(β = 0.503, p < 0.05) but the link from the peripheral route to management credibility is 
not significant (β = 0.180, p > 0.10). Interestingly, investor relations web page and good 
news is the only condition in which there is not a significant link between disclosure 
credibility and perceived usefulness and attitude, indicating that retail investors process 
good news from a company’s investor relations page almost entirely on the central 
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route.  Overall, H1 predicts that participants in both news valence conditions in the 
Twitter condition will exhibit stronger peripheral route processing than central route 
processing, while participants in the investor relations page condition will exhibit 
stronger central route processing. The results partially support H1, suggesting that retail 
investors receiving financial information via Twitter process the information at a more 
unconscious level. Additionally, the results suggest that investors who go to the 
company’s investor relations page to get financial information process the information 
on the central or conscious route. Overall, the results suggest that the channel through 
which management chooses to release financial information matters in determining 
investors’ beliefs about management credibility. 
5.6 Consequences of Reporting Channel on Management Credibility 
The structured equation model analyses also examine the consequences of 
different communication channels to management’s reporting credibility. Prior literature 
has found that management reporting credibility influences management’s ability to 
communicate with investors, and investors’ willingness to rely upon management’s 
information (Williams 1996, Hirst et al. 1999, Mercer 2005). All participants were asked 
three questions: how attractive the stock was, how many shares they would recommend 
the investment club to buy, and how many months they would recommend holding the 
stock. Panels A and B in Figure 2 show the links in the models between participants’ 
management credibility score and their rating of how attractive the stock is as an 
investment, how many shares they recommend buying and how long to hold the 
recommended shares. All links are significant in the models except the link between 
credibility and recommended time to hold in the investor relations page and bad news 
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condition which is insignificant at p > 0.10. The results suggest that the choice of 
disclosure channel does indeed influence investors’ judgments and decisions via 
investors’ beliefs about managements’ credibility. The next section discusses the 
differentiate effects of platform and news valence on management credibility. 
5.7 Supplemental Analysis of Latent Variables 
Section 5.5 results show that that SEM models are different between platform 
and news valence. In this section, using ANOVA, I compare the means of the four latent 
variables: argument quality, perceived usefulness, disclosure credibility and attitude, to 
determine whether they vary by platform and news valence. Additionally, I analyze the 
latent variables of relevance and investing experience as ELM posits that participants 
must have the motivation and ability to elaborate on the message. The sum of the 
measured variables for each latent variable was used in the analysis. Assumptions for 
normality and constant variance were checked for each variable and were found not to 
hold but only varied slightly from normal, as ANOVA is robust to slight departures from 
normality and when the cell sizes are  balanced is robust to departures from constant 
variance, I will rely upon the robustness of ANOVA in the following tests. 
Argument quality is measured using the sum of four questions. The overall model 
is significant (F=39.04, p<.0001). Table 3, Panel B shows that platform and news has a 
significant effect on argument quality at p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0001 respectfully, while 
Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are significantly lower from the company 
website means. A planned comparison of means by news and platform condition finds 
that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower  at -3.3596 difference from the 
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Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is found for the bad 
news condition by platform with a difference of -3.3045 significant at p <0.0001.  
TABLE 3     How Platform Affects Argument Quality    Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
      News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 17.6354 20.9400 -3.3596 19.2877  
 [0.3428] [0.3454] <0.0001 [0.2433]  
       
Good 19.1773 22.5920 -3.3045 20.8846  
 [0.3454] [0.3445] <0.0001 [0.2430]  
      
Overall Platform  18.4064 21.7660    
 [0.2424] 0.2439]      
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Argument Credibility (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 514.4952 514.4952 21.56 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 2277.0616 2277.0616 95.43 <.0001 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 0.6121 0.6121 0.03 0.8728 
(a)This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on argument quality. A 
composite measure of argument credibility was computed by summing the four argument 
quality questions presented in Table 1. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Perceived usefulness is measured using the sum of four questions. The overall 
model is significant (F=31.97, p<.0001). Table 4, Panel B shows that platform and news 
has a significant effect perceived usefulness at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0026 respectfully, 
while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website. A 
planned comparison of means by news and platform condition finds that the Twitter 
good news mean is significantly lower at -3.8247 difference from the Website bad news 
mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is found for the bad news condition by 
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platform with a difference of -3.8247 significant at p <0.0001.Usefulness of information 
has a long history in accounting research, starting with Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Beaver (1968). The information approach to financial reporting argues that market 
participants want to make their own predictions about future security returns. The logic 
then follows that any information that is useful to predicting future security returns will be 
desired by market participants. The finding that the participants perceive the social 
media platforms as less useful when either good or bad news is posted on them 
compared to when the same information is posted on the company website implies that 
participants do not find the platform useful for financial disclosures, and thereby 
companies would not benefit from using the platforms for financial disclosures.  
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TABLE 4     How Platform Affects Perceived Usefulness    Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
      News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 16.3152 20.1400 -3.4496 18.2276  
 [0.3899] [0.3928] <0.0001 [0.2767]  
       
Good 17.6847 21.1343 -3.8247 19.4095  
 [0.3928] [0.3918] <0.0001 [0.2763]  
       
Overall Platform  17.0000 20.6371    
 [0.2757] [0.2774]      
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Perceived Usefulness (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 281.8071 281.8071 9.13 0.0026 
PLATFORM 1 2668.8325 2668.8325 86.47 <.0001 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 7.0973 7.0973 0.23 0.6317 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on perceived usefulness. A 
composite measure of perceived usefulness was computed by summing the four perceived 
usefulness questions presented in Table 1. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of disclosure credibility. The overall 
model is significant (F=12.80, p<.0001). Table 5, Panel B shows that platform and news 
has a significant effect on disclosure credibility at p < 0.0001 and p < 0.0001 
respectfully, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the 
company website means for both good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison 
of means by news and platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is 
significantly lower  at -1.4642 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at 
p = 0.0146, similar finding is found for the bad news condition by platform with a 
difference of -1.5109 significant at p = 0.0201.These findings are interesting as the 
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company disclosing, Lafarge S.A., was the same for participants and all participants 
saw the same press releases but via different channels or disclosure bundles (Mayew 
2012). 
TABLE 5     How Platform Affects Disclosure Credibility    Panel A: Argument Quality, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
      News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 18.2807 19.7450 -1.5109 19.0128  
 [0.3505] [0.3531] 0.0201 [0.2487]  
       
Good 19.8472 21.3582 -1.4642 20.6027  
 [0.3505] [0.3522] 0.0146 [0.2484]  
       
Overall Platform  19.0640 20.5516    
 [0.2478] [0.2493]      
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Disclosure Credibility (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 509.9304 509.9304 20.45 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 446.4239 446.4239 17.90 <.0001 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1     0.1100     0.1100   0.00 0.9471 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on disclosure credibility. A 
composite measure of disclosure credibility was computed by summing the four disclosure 
credibility questions presented in Table 1. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of attitude. The overall model is 
significant (F=27.78, p<.0001). Table 6, Panel B shows that platform and news has a 
significant effect on attitude at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0001 respectfully, while Panel A 
shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website means for both 
good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison of means by news and platform 
condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower  at -3.2444 
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difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar finding is 
found for the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -3.0088 significant at p 
<0.0001. Overall, the results suggest that participants perceive a firm’s use of social 
media for financial reporting as foolish, a bad idea, unpleasant and disliked getting 
financial reports via the channel. 
TABLE 6      How Platform Affects Attitude    Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
       News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 17.2955 20.5400 -3.0088 18.9177  
 [0.3780] [0.3809] <0.0001 [0.2683]  
       
Good 18.8916 21.9004 -3.2444 20.3960  
 [0.3780] [0.3799] <0.0001 [0.2680]  
       
Overall Platform  18.0935 21.2202    
 [0.2673] [0.2690]    Panel B: ANOVA Model of Attitude (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 440.8673 440.8673 15.19 0.0001 
PLATFORM 1 1972.2174 1972.2174 67.96 <.0001 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 2.7986 2.7986  0.10 0.7562 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on attitude. A composite 
measure of attitude was computed by summing the four disclosure attitude questions 
presented in Table 1. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - 
missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis of relevance. The overall model is 
significant (F=59.55, p<.0001). Table 7, Panel B shows that platform and news has a 
significant effect on relevance at p < 0.0001 and p = 0.0152 respectfully, while Panel A 
shows that the means for Twitter are lower from the company website means for both 
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good and bad news conditions. A planned comparison of means by news and platform 
condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is significantly lower at  
-4.0308 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p <0.0001, similar 
finding is found for the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -3.6645 
significant at p <0.0001. 
TABLE 7      How Platform Affects Relevance    Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
       News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 12.3891 16.4200 -3.6645 14.4045  
 [0.2922] [0.2944] <0.0001 [0.2074]  
       
Good 13.2857 16.9502 -4.0308 15.1179  
 [0.2922] [0.2936] <0.0001 [0.2071]  
       
Overall Platform  12.8374 16.6851    
 [0.2066] [0.2079]       
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Relevance (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 102.6743 102.6743 5.92 0.0152 
PLATFORM 1 2986.7216 2986.7216 172.27 <.0001 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 6.7673 6.7673 0.39 0.5323 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on relevance. A composite 
measure of relevance was computed by summing the three disclosure relevance questions 
presented in Table 1. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - 
missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Investing experience is the average of age, investing experience and work 
experience. The overall model with platform, news and the interaction of platform and 
news is insignificant (F=0.24, p<.8718), so no further tests were conducted. 
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Table 8 presents the results of the analysis of attractiveness. The overall model 
is significant (F=22.96, p<.0001). Table 8, Panel B shows that news has a significant 
effect on attractiveness at p < 0.0001, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter 
are higher from the company website means for both good and bad news conditions but 
not significantly so. A planned comparison of means shows that the means are not 
significantly different across platforms. 
TABLE 8      How Platform Affects Attractiveness of Stock  Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
       News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 6.5227 6.2960 0.2267 6.7784  
 [0.1634] [0.1679] 1.0000 [0.0990]  
       
Good 8.1654 8.1544 0.0110 7.9304  
 [0.1592] [0.1610] 1.0000 [0.0989]  
       Overall Platform  7.4285 7.2803    
 [0.0986] [0.0992]       
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Attractiveness of Stock(b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 267.7140 267.4140 67.72 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 4.4345 4.4345 1.12 0.2899 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 0.3015 0.3015 0.08 0.7825 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on attractiveness of stock. 
Attractiveness of stock is measured using a 11 point Likert scale. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - 
missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis of stock recommendation. The overall 
model is significant (F=17.61, p<.0001). Table 9, Panel B shows that news has a 
significant effect on stock recommendation at p < 0.0001 but that platform is not 
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significant at p > 0.10, while Panel A shows that the means for Twitter are higher from 
the company website means for bad news conditions and lower in the good news 
condition. A planned comparison of means shows that the means are not significantly 
different across platforms confirming the ANOVA. 
TABLE 9      How Platform Affects Stock Recommendation  Panel A: Attitude, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a)  
       News Platform    
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
Bad 241.3448 233.0400 8.3048 237.1924  
 [28.9963] [29.2130] 1.0000 [20.5802]  
       
Good 433.7881 461.6069 -27.8188 447.6975  
 [28.9963] [29.1402] 1.0000 [20.5544]  
       Overall Platform  337.5665 347.3234    
 [20.5035] [20.6310]       
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Stock Recommendation (b)   
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 8939659.84 8939659.84 52.38 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 19205.53 19205.53 0.11 0.7374 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 65813.94 65813.94 0.39 0.5348 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on stock recommendation. Stock 
recommendation is measured between -1000 to 1000 shares. 
(b) Similar results are found after dropping participants who failed the manipulation check 
question and for wilcoxon signed rank test. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Recommended time to hold stock was measured on slider scale from 0 to 120 
representing the number of months. The overall model with platform, news and the 
interaction of platform and news is insignificant (F=0.88, p= 0.4533), so no further tests 
were conducted. 
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5.8 Test of Hypothesis Two and Three 
The above models show that investors process information differently depending 
on the communication channel and that those channels have consequences to the 
company by affecting perceptions of management credibility. However, it is important to 
determine whether management credibility is actually different between conditions. H2 
predicts that participants will judge management as less credible when viewing financial 
disclosures posted on the company’s Twitter feed than on the company’s investor 
relations web page.  H3 predicts that Twitter will moderate the effect of positive or 
negative financial news on the judgments of retail investors, compared to the same 
news released on traditional media (i.e. the company’s investor relations web page). To 
test these hypotheses, I first conduct an omnibus two-way ANOVA with Platform and 
News Valence and Platform X News Valence interaction terms as independent 
variables and the sum of the two management credibility questions as the dependent 
variable. 
The overall model is significant (F = 8.85, p < 0.0001). Table 10 presents the 
results of the analysis. Panel B shows a statistically significant main effect for both news 
valence (F = 18.39, two-tailed p < 0.0001) and a statistically significant main effect for 
platform (F = 7.70, p < 0.01) but not a statistically significant interaction between 
Platform and News Valence. The statistically significant main effect of Platform along 
with the mean of 14.6083 for Twitter versus a mean of 15.3877 for investor relations 
web page in Panel B support H2. A planned comparison of means by news and 
platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is marginally lower  at -0.6000 
difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p =0.0966 two-tailed, while 
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the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -0.9587 and is not statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 10      How Platform Affects Management Credibility 
Tests of H2 & H3      Panel A: Management Credibility, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 807(a) 
       
News Platform    
 
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
 
Bad 13.9162 14.875 -0.6000 14.3956   
 [0.2800] [0.2821] 0.0966 [0.1987]   
        
Good 15.3004 15.9004 -0.9587 15.6004   
 [0.2800] [0.2814] 0.7869 [0.1985]   
       
Overall Platform  14.6083 15.3877    
 [0.1980] [0.1992]        
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Management Credibility    
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 292.8692 292.87 18.39 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 122.5427 122.54 7.70 0.0057 
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 6.4907 6.49 0.41 0.5234 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management 
credibility. A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing 
the two management credibility questions presented in Table 1. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - 
missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
 
The results support the idea that investor’s view management as less credible 
after viewing financial disclosures that have been posted on social media than after 
viewing the same financial disclosure from the company’s investor relations web page. 
These results are particularly important to CEOs and CFOs, as they have the final say 
over what additional channels to release financial information on beyond the SEC 
mandated channels and guide company communication strategy (Holland 2005).  
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For Twitter to moderate the effects of news valence I predicted that the mean for 
Twitter and Good News would be less than the mean for investor relations web page 
and Good News and the mean for Twitter and Bad News would be higher than investor 
relations web page and Bad News. I expected the Platform X News Valence interaction 
to be significant. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant, failing to 
support H3.  
5.9 Additional Tests of Hypothesis Two and Three 
To check the robustness of my findings for H2 and H2, I dropped the participants 
that failed the manipulation check. I lose 276 observations by during so but the cell 
sizes are still approximately equal with 132 in the Twitter-Bad News condition, 125 in 
the Website-Bad News condition, 139 in the Twitter-Good News condition, and 136 in 
the Website-Good News condition. ANOVA is robust to slight variations from normal 
when cell sizes are with 1.5 times of each other, as all of the cells within the bounds the 
robustness of ANOVA is relied upon the following tests. The reduced model is 
significant (F = 11.53, p < 0.0001). Table 11 presents the results of the analysis. Panel 
B shows a statistically significant main effect for both news valence (F = 25.76, two-
tailed p < 0.0001) and a statistically significant main effect for platform (F = 8.41, p 
=0.0039) but not a statistically significant interaction between Platform and News 
Valence. The statistically significant main effect of Platform along with the mean of 
14.4253 for Twitter versus a mean of 15.4443 for investor relations web page in Panel B 
give further support to H2. Additional support A planned comparison of means by news 
and platform condition finds that the Twitter good news mean is marginally lower  at -
0.8762 difference from the Website bad news mean significant at p =0.1313 two-tailed, 
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while the bad news condition by platform with a difference of -1.1619 and is not 
statistically significant. 
TABLE 11      How Platform Affects Management Credibility Less Manipulation Failures 
Additional Tests of H2 & H3  
Panel A: Management Credibility, LSMean [Standard Error], n = 531(a) 
       
News Platform    
 
 Twitter Website 
Difference 
p-value 
Overall 
News  
 
Bad 13.4621 14.6240 -0.8762 14.0430   
 [0.3524] [0.3621] 0.1313 [0.2526]   
        
Good 15.3884 16.2647 -1.1619 15.8265   
 [0.3434] [0.3472] 0.4402 [0.2441]   
       
Overall Platform  14.4253 15.4443    
 [0.2460] [0.2508]        
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Management Credibility    
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value  
NEWS 1 422.4028 422.4028 25.76 <.0001  
PLATFORM 1 137.8959 137.8959 8.41 0.0039  
NEWS x PLATFORM 1 2.7089 2.7089 0.17 0.6846  
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility. 
A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two 
management credibility questions presented in Table 1. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - 
missed analyst forecasts), NEWS x PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
 
An additional ANCOVA was ran to test whether including the control variables of 
how often the participants use the platform they saw the company press releases on 
(USER), how familiar they are with Lafarge S.A.(FAMIL), and how often they review 
financial statements (REVIEW). The results are presented in Table 12. The model is 
significant at (F=7.56, p <0.0001). The variables of news is significant at p < 0.0001 
along with platform p = 0.0398 one-tailed per hypothesis, p = 0.0797 two-tailed. 
However, of the three control variables on how often participant’s use the platform 
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(USER) is significant at p = 0.0013, familiarity with Lafarge (FAMIL) and how often they 
review financial statements is not. 
Table 12      
ANCOVA Model of Management Credibility n=807 
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 257.1986 257.1986 16.46 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 48.1078 48.1078 3.08 0.0797 
USER 1 163.8917 163.8917 10.49 0.0013 
FAMIL 1 56.1895 56.1895 3.60 0.0583 
REVIEW 1 6.0576 6.0576 0.39 0.5337 
NEWS*PLATFORM 1 3.3973 3.3973 0.22 0.6411 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility.   
A composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two 
management credibility questions presented in Table 1. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), USER = how frequently the participant uses the platform on 7 point Likert 
scale, FAMIL = how familiar the participant is with Lafarge on 7 point Likert scale, REVIEW = 
how often the participant reviews financial statement on 7 point Likert scale, NEWS x 
PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
Table 13 shows the ANCOVA model with the manipulation failures dropped from 
the sample. The model is significant (F = 7.57, p < 0.0001), the news variable is still 
significant at p < 0.0001 and the platform variable strengthens from p = 0.0797 two-
tailed in the full sample to p = 0.0179 after the manipulation failures are dropped. USER 
is no longer significant but familiarity is at p = 0.0287 two-tailed. Review of financial 
statements continues to be statistically insignificant as does the interaction of news and 
platform. 
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Table 13      
ANCOVA Model of Management Credibility Less Manipulation Failures n=531 
Source of Variation DF Type III SS MS F-statistic p-value 
NEWS 1 379.7035 379.7035 23.48 <.0001 
PLATFORM 1 91.2175 91.2175 5.64 0.0179 
USER 1 48.0833 48.0833 2.97 0.0852 
FAMIL 1 77.8119 77.8119 4.81 0.0287 
REVIEW 1 2.6172 2.6172 0.16 0.6876 
NEWS*PLATFORM 1 2.0038 2.0038 0.12 0.7250 
(a) This table reports the effects of platform and news valence on management credibility. A 
composite measure of management credibility was computed by summing the two 
management credibility questions presented in Table 1. 
PLATFORM (Twitter or IR web page), NEWS (Good - beat analyst forecasts or Bad - missed 
analyst forecasts), USER = how frequently the participant uses the platform on 7 point Likert 
scale, FAMIL = how familiar the participant is with Lafarge on 7 point Likert scale, REVIEW = 
how often the participant reviews financial statement on 7 point Likert scale, NEWS x 
PLATFORM = the interaction of news and platform. 
As the sum variable of the two management credibility questions was perfectly 
normally distributed a non-parametric test Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was run to test the 
differences in the scores between platform and news valence. The results are 
presented in Table 14 for the full sample. The non-parametric tests show that the 
management credibility differs by platform p = 0.0197 two-tailed and by news valence p 
< 0.0001 further supporting H2. Table 13 present the non-parametric test of the sample 
after manipulation failures were removed the results are even stronger with platform 
significant at p = 0.0107 compared to a p = 0.0197 for the full sample, the news 
condition is the still significant at p < 0.0001.  
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Table 14    
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Management Credibility 
Panel A: Full Sample n = 807 
Condition N Mean Standard Deviation 
Twitter 406 385.0394 3300.0484 
Platform 401 423.1970 3300.0484 
    
Z-Score   2.3325  
p-valuea  0.0197  
    
Good 403 370.9851 3300.1092 
Bad 404 436.9331 3300.0192 
    
Z-Score   -4.0315  
p-valuea  < 0.0001  
    
Panel B: Less Manipulation Failures n = 531 
Condition N Mean Standard Deviation 
Twitter 271 249.8726 1766.1575 
Platform 261 283.7643 1766.1575 
    
Z-Score   2.5510  
p-valuea  0.0107  
    
Good 257 234.7354 1765.4582 
Bad 275 296.1854 1765.4582 
    
Z-Score   -4.6237  
p-valuea  < 0.0001  
a Two-tailed significance level 
Overall, the results support the hypothesis that participants’ perceptions of management 
credibility will differ by platform, in support of H2 but not that there is an interaction 
failing to support H3. 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I explore the effects of financial information press release announcements on 
social media platforms and more traditional electronic platforms, and whether doing so 
influences how retail investors process the information. I investigate how the platform on 
which financial information is presented affects the route through which the information 
is processed by investors, and the ensuing impact on their beliefs regarding 
management credibility. The results reveal that retail investors process financial 
information posted on Twitter via the peripheral or unconscious route more than the 
central or conscious route, extending the theory of product channel fit to the context of 
information processing. This is the first study to investigate how information is perceived 
and processed across different communication channels. Additionally, I find that 
financial disclosures on social media are associated with lower overall investor belief of 
management credibility which, I show to significantly influence investor judgment and 
decisions about the company. I find similar results after breaking out the participants to 
those that saw either good or bad news and the channel on which they saw the news. 
Participants that viewed financial disclosures on social media, in both the good and bad 
news conditions had lower perceptions of the disclosure in regard to argument quality, 
usefulness and credibility. However, participants’ perceptions of stock attractiveness, 
the number of shares they recommended to buy or sell to the investment club, or the 
number of months to hold the stock did not differ between platforms. It was only news 
valence that affected these measures, with good news associated with higher levels of 
attractiveness and higher number of recommended shares.  There was no significant 
interaction between platform and news valence. These findings confirm one of the 
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central tenets of ELM-- that individuals can process the same information differently but 
still arrive at the same judgment and decision. The ELM argument holds true in the this 
study as I find that peripheral (central) route processing is associated with lower (higher) 
perceptions of management credibility but not stock attractiveness, stock 
recommendation or recommended time to hold. Management credibility has been found 
to be an important factor in management’s ability to communicate information to the 
capital markets (Williams 1996, Hirst et al. 1999, Mercer 2004). Decreased 
management credibility explains why Jung et al. (2014) find that small investors do not 
respond to news releases via Twitter and why more communication is required of 
management via social media during product recalls. Thus, my study’s results are 
important, as I provide evidence of the effect of disclosure media on management 
credibility, which in turn significantly affects the immediate judgments and decisions 
regarding stock attractiveness and purchase. 
My results provide important insights for both companies and investors. Due to 
the multitude of communication channels available, companies must decide which 
channels allow them to reach the most investors with the same message. The research 
provides insight into how potential investors view financial information from companies 
and shows that financial information is processed differently across channels, despite 
coming from the same source, due to lack of fit between the message and the channel.  
In particular, the results of the research are informative to CEOs, CFOs and other 
executives responsible for financial reporting. I find that financial information 
disseminated on new communication channels (Twitter is under 10 years old and was 
only widely adopted beginning in 2009) are perceived as having lower argument quality, 
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credibility, and usefulness with retail investors overall having a lower attitude towards 
the channel. These diminished perceptions result in decreased perceptions of 
management credibility. The lack of management credibility could necessitate more 
disclosures, particularly for disclosures that lack fit, via the channel to have the same 
effect as fewer disclosures on more traditional channels where perceptions of 
management are higher. However, the benefits to management still exist as perceptual 
and attitudinal changes that occur via the peripheral route are less persistent, open to 
counter influence, and less predictive of future behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), 
indicating that management that engages an audience via new communication 
channels could ultimately be more successful in persuading the audience to their point 
of view versus withdrawing and using more traditional channels where central route 
processing is more dominant. Perception/attitude changes that occur via the central 
route are, in general, more stable, more enduring, and are more predictive of long-term 
behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) indicating that reverting to more traditional 
channels may not have the result desired by management if the goal is to change 
perceptions only temporarily.. 
Similarly, for investors, the information environment has changed markedly on 
where to obtain company information. Investors seeking to make optimal investing 
decisions can benefit from the study, as it shows that the communication channel that 
the investor first receives the information alters how the investor processes the 
information. For less experienced investors, starting at a social media channel to obtain 
financial information may cause them to miss important information about the company. 
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The results of this study should be interpreted considering its limitations. First, 
participants were asked to recommend increases or decreases to only 1,000 shares 
held by a hypothetical investment club and limited to that range in the experiment. The 
1,000 anchor may have resulted in decreased variability in the recommendations. 
Previous research on investment recommendation has used 10,000 shares (Farkas and 
Murthy 2013) and 100,000 shares (Elliot et al. 2012). It is possible that increasing the 
number of shares held will increase variability; a possibility that can be tested in future 
research.  
There are many avenues for future research on the role of social media in 
accounting. Future research could investigate whether the salience of the accounting 
information in the Twitter posts influences investors and how so, in this study investors 
only saw announcements of earnings in the Twitter posts but no actual accounting 
numbers. It would be interesting to investigate how tweets about specific financial 
events that are not earnings related influence investors. Additionally, in this study the 
source of the tweets was the company and tied to any one individual within the 
company.  A number of CEOs and CFOs and other executives within companies are 
active on Twitter and it would be interesting to know if individuals with high credibility 
within the social network or community have lower credibility as a result of using social 
media for Reg FD disclosures. Furthermore, research on the role of community 
sentiment, as measured by likes or the number of followers and the subsequent 
influence on investors and other decision makers, could be informative to both investors 
and management. Finally, in this study I use financial disclosures from a business to 
business firm; it is unknown whether similar results would be found for firms that are 
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primarily consumer or serviced oriented and have high social status firms, as measured 
by number of followers, has on investors. 
In summary, I find that when product-channel fit is low, retail investors process 
information unconsciously compared to when product-channel fit is high and retail 
investors process the information consciously. The effect is particularly pronounced 
when retail investors viewed good news from the firm. Additionally, I find that when 
product-channel fit is low, management credibility is lower compared to when product-
channel fit is high. Understanding the interaction of message and channel and 
subsequent effects on decisions is both timely and important. 
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Experiment Procedures 
1. Informed Consent a. Non-professional Investor Question 
  b. Informed Consent 
 
2. Introduction a. Case Material 
  b. Profile of Lafarge 
  c. Lafarge financial ratios vs. industry 
  d. Map of countries where Lafarge operates 
 
3. Main Experiment a. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR) 
  b. Lafarge Q2 2012 press release  
  c. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR) 
  d. Lafarge sells assets press release 
  e. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR) 
   f. Lafarge Q3 2012 press release 
  g. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR) 
  h. Announce of joint venture 
   i. Press Release headlines (Twitter or IR) 
    j. Reuters news articles announcing Lafarge  
     misses (bad news) or beats (good news). 
 k. Lafarge 2012 Annual Results press release 
 
4. Main Experiment  a. Attractiveness as an investment 
Questions b. Recommendation 
 c. Time recommendation 
 d. Justification 
 e. Management competence 
  f. Trust in management 
 g. Manipulation question 
 h. ELM questions 
  i. Post experimental questionnaire 
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APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
Have bought or sold stocks in the past 12 months? 
 Yes 
 No 
Page Break 
I appreciate you taking the time to respond to this research survey. The primary 
objective of this study is to obtain a better understanding of how effective it is for 
companies to invest in social media initiatives. Additionally, I hope to better understand 
when it is desirable for companies to invest in social media initiatives. You will be asked 
to read some press releases from a company and then provide your opinions on the use 
of technologies by companies. You must be 18 or older in order to participate in this 
research survey. 
  
Please note that your responses to this research survey are anonymous. In addition, 
please note that completion of the survey is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time 
but that, as mentioned, I strongly believe you will find the research interesting. The 
survey should take no more than 30 minutes to complete.  During that time you will be 
asked to indicate your social media preferences. Your responses will be compiled with 
other participants.  Then, I will examine how your responses compare to other 
individuals. 
  
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me, Neal Snow 
(the Principal Investigator in charge of this research study) at 813-974-6863. This study, 
titled "Information Processing Study," is IRB study #12268. If you have questions about 
your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or complaints, concerns or 
issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research study, call the Division of 
Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South Florida at 813-974-5638. 
  
If you are interested in participating, please click the “Next” button below. By clicking the 
“Next” button you are confirming that are you 18 years or older. 
  
You must complete the study and enter in the unique id given at the end in order to 
receive payment Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
  
Sincerely, 
  
Neal Snow 
Principal Investigator 
University of South Florida  
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For the purpose of the survey, please imagine that you have joined a local investment 
club. At the last meeting the club asked you to monitor, evaluate, and make a 
recommendation (up to 1,000 shares) for the club regarding one company, Lafarge 
S.A..  The club currently holds 1,000 shares in the company. 
 
You will be shown a profile of the company to familiarize you with the company followed 
by additional information from the company that was released on popular investor 
relation sites during 2012 and 2013. 
 
Using the information, you will then be asked to make and justify a recommendation to 
the club regarding whether the club should increase or decrease its investment in the 
company.  You may want to take notes on the information that you view to help you 
make the recommendation. 
 
Please note, depending on your internet speed some pages may take a few seconds to 
load. 
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Lafarge S.A. produces and sells building materials under the Lafarge brand worldwide.  
 
The company produces and sells a range of cement and hydraulic binders, including basic Portland and masonry 
cements, and various other blended and specialty cements and binders for the construction industry. It also offers 
technical support, ordering and logistical assistance, documentation, demonstrations, and training services relating to the 
use of cements, as well as engages in cement trading activities. In addition, the company produces and sells aggregates, 
which comprise hard rock, such as limestone and granite; natural sand, gravel, recycled asphalt, and ready mix concrete, 
as well as products and services relating to paving activities. Further, it provides wallboard and finishing products, as well 
as gypsum plaster, plaster blocks, joint compounds, metal studs, anhydrite binders for self-leveling floorscreeds, and 
industrial plasters.  
 
The company sells its products to concrete producers, precast concrete product manufacturers, contractors, builders, 
masons, building materials wholesalers, asphalt producers, road contractors, construction companies, general building 
materials distributors, plasterboard installers, wallboard specialty dealers, do-it-yourself home centers, and transforming 
industries. The company, formerly known as J. et A. Pavin de Lafarge, was founded in 1833 and is headquartered in 
Paris, France.   
 
Lafarge S.A. trades on the Paris Stock Exchange under the symbol LG. 
 
Source: BloombergBusinessWeek 
 
  Financial ratios Operating metrics 
Company name 
Current r
atio 
Lt debt 
to assets 
Total 
debt to 
assets 
Lt debt 
to equity 
Total 
debt to 
equity 
Return 
on avg 
assets 
Return 
on avg 
equity 
Return on 
 investment 
Lafarge S.A. 1.11 29.14 36.91 74.24 94.02 1.92 3.67 2.53 
Industry Average 1.49 27.03 31.60 102.88 116.51 1.17 0.96 1.80 
 
 
Data Source: FactSet via Google Finance 
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Lafarge operates in 58 countries and has 68,000  employees as of 12/31/2011. 
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Figure B1 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed 
Figure B2 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page  
101 
 
Figure B3 Screenshot Lafarge Q2 Press Release Shown to All Participants  
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Figure B4 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Second Time Shown 
 
Figure B5 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Second Time Shown  
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Figure B6 Screenshot Lafarge Press Release Sale of Assets in USA Shown to All  
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Figure B7 Screenshot of Lafarge Twitter Feed Third Time Shown 
Figure B8 Screenshot of Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Third Time Shown 
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Figure B9 Screenshot Lafarge Q3 Press Release Shown to All Participants  
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Figure B10 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Fourth Time Shown 
 
Figure B11 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Fourth Time Shown  
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Figure B12 Screenshot Lafarge Joint Venture Press Release Shown to All  
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Figure B13 Screenshot Lafarge Twitter Feed Fifth Time Shown 
 
Figure B14 Screenshot Lafarge Investor Relations Web Page Fifth Time Shown  
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Figure B15 Screenshot Reuters Article on Lafarge Missing Forecasts Shown to all 
in Bad News Condition  
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Figure B16 Screenshot Reuter Article on Lafarge Missing Forecats Shown to all in 
Good News Condition  
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Figure B17 Screenshot Lafarge Annual Report Press Release Shown to All  
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How attractive is Lafarge as an investment? 
 Very 
unattractive 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very 
attractive 
11 
                        
 
 
By what number of shares do you recommend the investment club change its current 
1,000 share investment in Lafarge S.A.? (decrease/increase up to 1000 shares) 
______ Number of shares 
 
How long do you recommend the investment club hold its investment in Lafarge S.A.? 
______ Number of months 
 
Please list one to three key factors for your recommendation below. 
 
Page Break 
I think Lafarge S.A.'s management has the <b>competence</b> necessary to make 
clear and unbiased financial disclosures on Twitter. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly 
Agree 
11 
                        
 
 
I <b>trust</b> Lafarge S.A.'s management to make clear and unbiased financial 
disclosures on Twitter. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly 
Agree 
11 
                        
Page Break 
Did Lafarge S.A., meet, beat or miss analyst forecasts in the fourth quarter? 
 Meet 
 Beat 
 Miss 
Page Break 
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Approximately how many followers did the Lafarge Twitter feed have? 
 Less than 5,000 followers 
 Between 5,000 and 10,000 followers 
 Between 10,000 and 50,000 followers 
 Greater than 50,000 followers 
 Page Break 
Financial information provided through the company's Twitter feed was... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Informative               
Helpful               
Valuable               
Persuasive               
 
Financial information provided through the company's Twitter feed was... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Trustworthy               
Credible               
Honest               
Reliable               
Page Break 
Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
increased my 
productivity (e.g., 
make my work 
faster). 
              
increased my 
performance (e.g., 
make my work 
better). 
              
made me more 
effective (e.g., 
helped me make 
better decisions). 
              
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I found the company's Twitter feed to be useful for obtaining financial information. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
                
 
 
Page Break 
Using the company's Twitter feed to obtain financial information was... 
 Strongly Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
important.               
relevant 
(appropriate).               
necessary.               
 
Page Break 
 
Using the company's Twitter feed  to obtain financial information was a _______ idea. 
 Bad 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Good 
7 
                
 
 
Using the company's Twitter feed  to obtain financial information was a ________ idea. 
 Foolish 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Wise 
7 
                
 
 
Using the company's Twitter feed  to obtain financial information was _________ . 
 Unpleasant 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Pleasant 
7 
                
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Overall, I _______ the idea of obtaining financial information from the company's Twitter 
feed.  
 Dislike 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Like 
7 
                
 
Page Break 
 
How often do you use Twitter? 
 Never 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 A great 
deal 
7 
                
 
Questions for participants in company website condition 
Financial information provided through the company's website was... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Informative               
Helpful               
Valuable               
Persuasive               
 
Page Break 
Financial information provided through the company's website was... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Trustworthy               
Credible               
Honest               
Reliable               
 
Page Break 
116 
Using the company's website to obtain financial information... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
increased my 
productivity (e.g., make 
my work faster). 
              
increased my 
performance (e.g., 
make my work better). 
              
made me more 
effective (e.g., help me 
make better decisions). 
              
 
 
I found the company's website to be useful for obtaining financial information. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
                
 
Page Break 
Using the company's website to obtain financial information was... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Strongly 
Agree 
7 
important.               
relevant 
(appropriate).               
necessary.               
 
Page Break 
 
Using the company's website to obtain financial information was a _______ idea. 
 Bad 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Good 
7 
                
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Using the company's website to obtain financial information was a _______ idea. 
 Foolish 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Wise 
7 
                
 
Using the company's website to obtain financial information was _______ . 
 Unpleasant<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 Pleasant 
7 
                
 
Overall, I _______ the idea of obtaining financial information from the company's 
website. 
 Dislike 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Like 
7 
                
 
Page Break 
 
How often do you visit company websites? 
 Never 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 A great 
deal 
7 
                
 
Post Experiment Questionnaire 
How often do you visit company websites? 
 Never 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 A great 
deal 
7 
                
 
Before taking this study, how familiar were you with Lafarge S.A.? 
 Not at all 
familiar 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 Very 
familiar 
7 
                
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How old are you? _________ 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School / GED 
 Some College 
 2-year College Degree 
 4-year College Degree 
 Masters Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
How many years of professional work experience do you have? _________ 
 
How many accounting classes have you taken post high school? 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 5 
 6 or more 
 
How many business classes have you taken post high school? 
 0 
 1 - 4 
 5 - 9 
 10 - 14 
 15 or more 
 
How many years of investing experience do you have? 
 
How often do you review company financial information 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 3-4 times a year 
 Once a year 
 Never 
 
What broker do you use to trade stocks, bonds or  mutual funds? __________ 
 
How much does your broker charge per trade? __________ 
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On a balance sheet, Assets = Liabilities + ______ 
 Stockholder's Equity 
 Revenue 
 Net Income 
 Long Term Liabilities 
 
Do you have any comments or suggestions about this survey? 
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3/20/2013 
Neal Snow, M.A.  
School of Accountancy 
4202 East Fowler Ave. 
Tampa, FL 33620 
 
RE: 
 
Exempt Certification 
IRB#: Pro00012268 
Title: Information Processing Study 
 
Study Approval Period: 3/20/2013 to 3/20/2018 
Approved Items: 
Protocol Document: 
Snow eIRB Protocol 
 
Informed Consent Script: 
IRB_Letter.docx 
 
Dear Dr. Snow: 
 
On 3/20/2013, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets USF 
requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations at 
45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), 
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: 
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, 
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human 
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or 
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is 
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in 
the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. Please note that changes to this 
protocol may disqualify it from exempt status.  Please note that you are responsible for notifying 
the IRB prior to implementing any changes to the currently approved protocol. 
121 
The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a period of five 
years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final Progress Report is received, 
whichever is longer.  If you wish to continue this protocol beyond five years, you will need to 
submit a new application at least 60 days prior to the end of your exemption approval period. 
Should you complete this study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a 
request to close the study. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If you have 
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
 
